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Good clean water where we need it, when we need it – this is taken for granted by some, 
and is still only a dream for many others. Part of the challenge in meeting our water needs 
lies in getting to grips with what people are doing ‘up in the hills’. Land in the upper 
catchments may be used in ways that greatly affect the quantity and quality of water we 
get downstream. To get the water we want we have traditionally relied on regulation, 
exhortation, cooperation or just keeping our fingers crossed. What about some cold hard 
cash? What if downstream beneficiaries paid for agreed upstream land uses? This is the idea 
behind payments for watershed services. 
But who will sell, who will buy, and under what conditions? Can this be good for 
ecosystems and good for reducing poverty too? There is lots of theory about this.  
This report explores the evidence. It describes what the facilitators in a range of  
watershed sites around the world have learned in their efforts to establish such  
payment schemes. It concludes that these payments schemes are difficult to set up  
– but where they have been set up, they are generally beginning to do some good  
(there is not much evidence that they do any harm). More significantly, payments  
schemes – or efforts to set them up – have brought the current winners and losers  
into the open, and kicked off debate on what can be done. What is now needed  
is for more ‘buyers’ to step forward, and for the facilitators of payments for  
watershed services schemes to put hard-learned lessons from experience into  
practice at larger scales – ensuring buyers get what they pay for, sellers get  
a decent price, and watersheds get a fair deal. 
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Executive summary
Payments for watershed services – clear theory, fuzzy practice
Payments for ecosystem services make good sense. People who look after 
ecosystems so that others can benefit from them should surely be rewarded in some 
way by the beneficiaries, shouldn’t they? In the case of watershed ecosystems, 
downstream beneficiaries of wise upstream land and water stewardship should 
compensate these upstream stewards. These ‘payments for watershed services’ 
(PWS) should contribute to the costs of watershed management and, if upstream 
communities are also characterised by poverty, these payments should contribute to 
local development and poverty reduction as well. All this seems sensible, especially 
in the light of increasing degradation of many of the world’s watersheds.
So much for the idea, what about the reality? Are lots of payments being made? Are 
they an effective tool for shifting land and natural resource management towards 
sustainability? And, with experience telling us that markets are rarely designed 
to conserve the environment or to address poverty and inequality, what magic is 
involved in making payments for watershed services do both? 
Debates about both conservation and development have seen a wave of excitement 
about payments for watershed services in recent years. But on the ground an 
equivalent surge of action is harder to see. There has been a lot of talk about ideals 
and considerable extrapolation of conclusions from a few case studies, mostly from 
developed or middle-income countries. There have been fewer efforts to initiate 
and concertedly track the complex business of developing payments for watershed 
services in low-income countries.
However, several projects and programmes have emerged over the last few years 
to test the efficacy of payments for watershed services as both a development and 
conservation intervention. Amongst them, IIED and its partners have been building 
on earlier international case study work to set up new PWS schemes – to ‘learn by 
doing’ and to improve our understanding of the opportunities and the challenges.
Exploring real-world schemes – action-learning and global review  
The first phase of this work began in 2001 with diagnostic studies in India, South 
Africa, Indonesia and four Caribbean island states. An implementation phase 
started in late 2003 and involved partners and sites in India, Indonesia, China, 
South Africa, Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Bolivia. This action-learning focused on the 
following watersheds:
 
2l The Bhoj Wetlands in Madhya Pradesh state, and Bhodi-Suan and Kuhan in 
Himachal Pradesh state, India.
l The Brantas River in East Java province and the Cidanau River in Banten province, 
Indonesia.
l The Sabie-Sand catchment in Mpumalanga province and the Ga-Selati River in  
Limpopo province, South Africa. 
l The Buff Bay/Pencar catchment, Jamaica and the Talvan catchment, Saint Lucia.
l The Rio Los Negros watershed, Santa Cruz department, Bolivia. 
l In China, the work focused on local and national processes rather than on 
developing payments for watershed services at particular sites. 
The above ten sites were selected by the in-country teams on the basis that they 
offered good chances of developing payment mechanisms for watershed services. 
Over three years the teams worked with partners and stakeholders to develop 
payment mechanisms. In three of the sites (Kuhan, Brantas and Cidanau), new 
payment mechanisms between upstream land users and downstream water users 
were developed. In Bolivia, the existing payments scheme on the Los Negros was 
strengthened through its work with the project.
IIED also conducted a global review of 50 cases of payments for watershed services 
in developing countries (of some 123 initiatives initially identified, 73 were excluded 
from the analysis either because they did not fit the PWS definition used or because 
insufficient information could be found on them). This review updates and builds 
upon IIED’s 2002 review of PWS schemes (alongside payments schemes for other 
ecosystem services), Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold? The new review found that of the 
42 initiatives analysed in 2002, only 15 can be considered still active, while a further 
three remain at the proposal stage, and 21 (50 per cent) have been abandoned or 
are of uncertain status. On reflection, the remainder of the sample (three) were 
reclassified as marginal or borderline PWS projects.
Key questions – and answers from the evidence so far
Some of the main findings from the work follow – presented in the form of 
questions and answers using the evidence we have:
Can payments for watershed services reduce poverty and improve livelihoods?
Yes, but the number of cases in which livelihoods have clearly been improved is 
small. We conclude that:
l There are better ways of reducing poverty through than through PWS, such as 
improving education, health and nutrition. 
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3l There are significant and positive indirect effects of PWS – particularly in building 
social capita in poor communities.
l There is little evidence of PWS doing any harm to poor people.
l Effective targeting can make PWS programmes more effective at alleviating 
poverty.
Payments for watershed services should not be considered as a tool for widespread 
use in reducing poverty in developing countries. While evidence from some schemes 
shows modest increases in household incomes from PWS, the effects cannot be 
considered to represent substantial reductions in poverty. Our evidence does, 
however, suggest that indirect effects of PWS development – such as improved social 
cohesion, community confidence, and new entrepreneurial relationships – have 
substantial potential to reduce poverty, yet these effects are rarely specific to PWS 
and could potentially be generated through alternative actions.
What has been the impact of payments for watershed services on water and 
land management? 
Impact has been modest to date. Environmental impacts causally attributable to 
PWS schemes appear to be limited. We conclude that:
l The relationship between land use and water is complicated and site specific.
l Even when the scientific evidence is weak locally logical and fair action may still 
be feasible.
l Targeting environmentally sensitive or critical areas within watersheds will 
increase the effectiveness of PWS mechanisms.
There is little evidence from the action-learning sites to suggest that payments for 
watershed services have had a significant effect on land and water management 
– although the schemes are generally still in their infancy and at pilot scale (indeed 
our review work suggests that about 50 per cent of new PWS initiatives fail). 
While some schemes around the world are promising in this regard, our review 
work generally confirms this picture of very limited environmental effects. In this 
context, it is unsurprising that perceptions about watershed service provision are, 
at best, only one of many factors involved in decisions about upland land use. 
Interrogation of these perceptions may be a key additional function that PWS 
schemes look to provide.
What factors affect supply of watershed services? 
Land users may change their behaviour in response to several factors, only some of 
which can be influenced through PWS schemes. We conclude that:
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l Awareness of market opportunities is low – third party facilitators can play a key 
role in introducing PWS as an option.
l Payments need to be big enough relative to other opportunities to create a real 
incentive for change.
l Cultural factors such as resistance to value ecosystem goods and services can 
constrain the development of PWS mechanisms.
To change farmers’ behaviour, payments for watershed services must be 
competitive with existing and perceived future net returns to land and labour. 
However, insufficient connections between suppliers and users of watershed 
services, coupled with social resistance to payment mechanisms in some contexts, 
are major barriers that intermediary organisations often find difficult to overcome.
How much demand is there for watershed services? 
The demands on land, water and other resources within watersheds are growing, 
and increasingly competing with each other. We conclude that:
l Private sector demand for watershed services is still low.
l Large publicly funded schemes as in China or South Africa can both constrain or 
stimulate privately funded schemes.
In nearly every watershed, in nearly every country, water quality and quantity are 
deteriorating because of increasing demands and changes in land use. The concept 
of someone paying for ecosystem services is relatively new, and the existence of 
a compelling ‘business case’ for them to do so is relatively rare. While demand in 
Africa remains low, there are considerably more schemes in Latin America and Asia.
What kinds of payments are being made in emerging PWS schemes? 
There is considerable diversity in the method and frequency of payments in 
emerging PWS schemes – from cash to in-kind payments, from one-off to regular 
payments. We conclude that:
l Diverse payments and payment mechanisms are a response to local conditions 
and watershed values.
l Differentiated payments within a scheme are both possible and practical.
l Prices for watershed services are yet to be determined by ‘the market’; in most 
cases prices are set by administrators and intermediaries.
l One-off payments to help farmers move from one technology to another may 
be more realistic than in-perpetuity payments.
l A wide variety of other incentives (i.e. tax breaks, free seedlings) for watershed 
management are in play that may one day lead to PWS.
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There are strong regional differences in the prevalence of PWS schemes between 
Latin America (expanding number and scale of PWS schemes), Asia (experimenting), 
and Africa (schemes are still to be developed). Schemes are also strongly 
differentiated between local users and national or government-funded programmes. 
Some programmes address water quality, others tackle water quantity problems, 
and others ‘bundle’ different services. Private landholders are the predominant 
suppliers of watershed services in user-based and national programmes, while 
communal landholders tend to be under-represented. Funds and transfer payments 
are handled by intermediaries in most cases, sometimes using dedicated trust 
fund arrangements, and the trend appears to be for simple payment structures. 
Asymmetries in power, resources and information between stakeholders suggest that 
efficient price determination mechanisms are unlikely to develop in the near future.
What role does government play in the development of payments for 
watershed services? 
Government’s role is at best enabling, at worst obstructive – but it is essential.  
We conclude that:
l Government legal and policy frameworks shape what is possible and not possible 
in PWS schemes.
l Government policy is frequently fragmented, often perverse and often based on 
very simple and hydrological models.
l Government’s role in defining and upholding land ownership is particularly critical.
l Balancing regulation and incentives, equity and efficiency, is easier said than done.
Some governments, like those in China, Costa Rica, Mexico and South Africa, become 
buyers of watershed services; all governments, through policy and legal frameworks, 
are critical for shaping how PWS schemes develop. Land and resource tenure is 
particularly important – but much policy and law is contradictory or ineffective. PWS 
protagonists may be able to help governments consider the appropriate balance 
between efficiency and equity in policy and law.
How can trust and transaction costs be optimised to make PWS work? 
Trust and transaction costs are the ‘make or break’ for PWS schemes. We conclude that:
l Using existing institutions can reduce transaction costs.
l Neutral intermediaries fulfil multiple roles in developing and maintaining PWS 
relationships.
l Trust between stakeholders reduces transaction costs – but it is hard to build and 
easy to lose.
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Existing local institutions are crucial but are often lacking and are rarely a panacea 
for existing land and water problems. Developing, implementing and monitoring 
PWS mechanisms can lead to high transaction costs that undermine viability, 
compromise efficiency and will jeopardise long-term sustainability. Whatever route 
is taken for the management of watersheds, maintaining trust amongst the key 
stakeholders is the key to keeping transaction costs low and manageable. 
 
Ways forward 
Looking ahead, we suggest action is best concentrated in the following main ways: 
Keep the experiments coming, keep learning from them, and keep adapting 
PWS schemes are difficult to set up, and they should not be seen as a blueprint for 
conservation or poverty reduction. Yet there is strong justification for their further 
exploration and development. Adaptive management of PWS approaches is needed 
– maintaining a flexible approach to implementation and ensuring that work on PWS 
recognises what can be learned from experience to date. Such adaptive approaches 
are best built on site-specific approaches to assessment that identify ecosystem 
functions that, in turn, support provision of locally valued ecosystem services.
Expect and prepare for negotiation, and a blend of incentive and regulation
Buyers, sellers and intermediaries in PWS schemes have unequal powers and 
abilities to generate and use evidence. As in any field where uncertainty and 
complexity prevail, actors need to work together, to treat each others’ views 
as legitimate, to expect change, and to keep questioning experience. It may be 
possible in some contexts for PWS schemes to develop without strong enabling 
regulatory frameworks and institutional cooperation. But at larger scales they can 
only serve effectively as components of diverse, and at best integrated, watershed 
strategies. It is only at smaller scales that causes and effects can be reasonably well 
understood and stakeholders can become directly engaged. Work at this scale may 
also develop the capacity to engage at larger scales in a way that is accountable to 
livelihood interests. 
Ensure that capacity is built and returns to livelihoods improve 
Negotiated and adaptive approaches will only be achieved if capability in a range 
of disciplines is steadily built. It is clear that in many attempted PWS schemes 
critical expertise, notably in hydrology, is very thinly spread and in some cases 
absent. Initiatives to make relevant expertise more accessible to those engaged 
with watershed issues, and to develop credible rapid assessment methods and other 
negotiation support tools, are sorely needed. In contexts of poverty, the need for 
strategies to improve the links between PWS and improved livelihoods is pressing. 
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These include: better targeting of the poorest households; reducing the barriers to 
entry; and creative means of involving landless, often the poorest, households.
Take the lessons from watersheds into the climate change arena
With climate change becoming the top global environment and development issue, 
and with the spotlight turning anew to land use and deforestation, new imperatives 
and opportunities have emerged for PWS experience. Much like PWS, payments 
for reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) in developing 
countries are conceptually simple but will be challenging to implement. However, 
sensitively implemented, they could represent long-term streams of finance to 
ecosystem services that vastly exceed any previous financial transfers made through 
development assistance channels. But there are many hurdles between conceptual 
appeal and effective implementation. There are questions of governance, and in 
particular just how appropriate it is to insist on conditionality or contingency in 
payments for reduced deforestation. Other issues that are likely to be contentious 
are monitoring, reporting and verifying emission reductions, especially when the 
projects are operating at large scales in remote, sparsely populated areas. In parts 
of the world that will become more arid and climate stressed, REDD and related 
interventions will need to recognise, and be assessed for, their implications on all 
other ecosystem services, particularly water. A focus solely on emissions reduction 
and carbon sequestration could easily lead to interventions that ignore the multiple 
services and complexity of ecosystems and landscapes. Getting REDD wrong could be 
bad news for the environment and livelihoods; getting it right could greatly brighten 
the prospect of fair deals for watershed services.
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Growing assets: reforestation supported by a payments for environmental services scheme in 
Costa Rica
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1 Introduction: the problem and potential 
 of payments for watershed services
1.1 What this report is about
This report is about the complex business of trying to put a simple conservation 
and development idea into practice. The idea is that watershed degradation in 
developing countries might be better tackled than it currently is if downstream 
beneficiaries of wise land use in watershed areas paid for these benefits. There 
are some examples around the world of this idea being put into practice – this 
report reviews these and describes what happened when teams in six developing 
countries set about exploring how the idea works on the ground. 
There are five sections in this report. The remainder of this introduction puts forward 
the problem addressed by the report and the potential of payments for watershed 
services in tackling it. Section 2 outlines the approaches taken in the project, the 
partners involved, the various case study sites and their biophysical, social, political 
and economic settings (further key facts about these partners and sites are outlined 
in Appendix 1 and 2 respectively). Findings to date from these sites are introduced 
and discussed in Section 3, which also summarises findings from an international 
review of cases of payments for watershed services. A summary of some of the 
lessons learned from experience is then offered in Section 4. Section 5 looks at the 
future for payments for watershed services and the links with climate change.
1.2 Problems with watersheds and dilemmas in conservation  
 and development
Recent major global assessments of ecosystems and development present a mixed 
picture, but generally not a good one (Adams and Jeanrenaud, 2008). In its 2007 
stocktake, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) concludes that the 
general situation is ‘continued overuse of the Earth’s ecosystems and negative 
impact on the environment, as well as some progress in global policies to address 
major environmental issues’ (UNEP, 2007). The World Wide Fund for Nature’s (WWF) 
‘ecological footprint index’ suggests that humanity’s resource consumption and 
waste production exceeds the Earth’s bio-capacity by about 25 per cent (WWF, 
2006). The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) estimated that 15 of the 24 
major ecosystem services that support humanity (through provision of fresh water, 
replenishment of fertile soil, or regulation of the climate for example) are being 
pushed beyond their sustainable limits or are already operating in a degraded state 
(MA, 2005). 
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Watershed ecosystems exemplify this situation (Box 1). Some promising trends 
were identified by the Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in 
Agriculture (CAWMA, 2007) – pulling together in 2007 some five years of work by 
more than 700 scientists and practitioners from around the world. For example, 
land and water productivity has risen steadily, with average grain yields rising from 
1.4 metric tons per hectare to 2.7 metric tons over the past four decades. Potential 
increases in yields are greatest in rain-fed areas, where many of the world’s 
poorest people live and where managing water is the key to such increases. In 
facing the demands of a world population of 8–9 billion expected by 2050, with 
determined change there is real scope to increase production on many existing 
irrigated lands. There is also real potential in many areas for highly productive 
pro-poor groundwater use, e.g., in the lower Ganges of Indian subcontinent and 
parts of sub-Saharan Africa. CAWMA concluded that there is enough fresh water 
to produce food for all the world’s people over the next half century, but also that 
failure to drastically improve the efficiency of water use in this period will mean 
that environmental crises will be experienced in many locations (Molden, 2007).
Huge gains have been made in meeting human needs through water resources 
development. Between 1990 and 2000, 1.2 billion people were supplied with both 
improved water and access to improved sanitation (WHO and UNICEF, 2006). This is 
a massive achievement, although population growth has diminished its impact, but 
reaching the ‘second billion’ is proving a harder and slower task – some 1.1 billion 
people still lack access to an improved water source and most of these people 
use about five litres of water a day – one quarter of the 20 litres now considered 
a minimum threshold and, increasingly, a basic human right, and one tenth of the 
average daily amount used in rich countries to flush toilets (UNDP, 2006).  
At the same time, water resources development and other natural resource uses 
have themselves become direct drivers of ecosystem degradation, which is now 
being compounded in particular by climate change and nutrient pollution. Two 
major causes for concern stand out. Firstly, the gains from the exploitation of 
natural resources are unevenly distributed, while the costs of ecosystem change 
– including the loss of indigenous forests and the declining quality and amount 
of land and freshwater – have been borne disproportionately by the poorer 
sections of society (Bass et al., 2005). Secondly, the reinvestment of wealth from 
exploitation of natural resources has not been sufficient for future generations to 
be able to adapt their way out of problems using improved technology (Arrow et 
al., 2003). It is very clear that at the current rates of decline of ecosystem services 
and environmental degradation the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that 
underpin the global policy drive to eradicate poverty are unlikely to be achieved 
(UNDP, 2007).
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Some ecosystems and the services that they provide are being degraded because 
nobody has an incentive to look after them.1 This is because many ecosystem 
services are positive externalities (i.e. unintended and uncompensated benefits) 
and/or public goods (because they cost little or nothing to supply to additional 
users, but the cost of excluding those users is extreme) (Markandya et al., 2002). 
Although ecosystem services are critical for life on earth they are not traded in 
markets and therefore have no observable price to guide their supply and demand. 
For this reason, central governments or local administrations have historically 
1. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment installs a broad definition of ‘ecosystem services’: the 
benefits people obtain from ecosystems. These fall into four main categories: provisioning services 
like food, water, fibre and energy (i.e. goods, products, resources); regulating services like climate and 
flood regulation; cultural services like aesthetics, spirituality, education and recreation; and supporting 
services like nutrient cycling and soil formation (MA, 2005). Meanwhile the literature on payments for 
‘environmental services’ has tended to focus on the last three categories and exclude ‘provisioned’ 
goods and resources. From this point onwards in this report, however, the terms ‘ecosystem services’ 
and ‘environmental services’ are used interchangeably.
B
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Poor people and watershed services – some numbers
Better links between land use and improved water quality and water quantity are an 
attractive proposition in a world where: 
l 1.6 million children under five years of age die each year because of unclean water and 
poor sanitation. 
l The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving by 2015 the proportion of people 
without sustainable access to safe drinking water will be missed by 235 million people on 
current trends. To meet the MDG, 300,000 people need to be served each day, every day, 
from now until 2015.  
l Over 4,000 litres of water is needed each day to produce enough food for a healthy diet 
for each person on the planet. A calorie of food takes a litre of water to produce. A kilo of 
grain takes 500–4,000 litres, a kilo of industrially produced meat 10,000 litres.
l Diseases and productivity losses linked to water and sanitation in developing countries 
amount to 2 per cent of GDP, rising to 5 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa – more than the 
region gets in aid. 
l Water insecurity linked to climate change threatens to increase the number of people 
suffering from malnutrition by 75–125 million by 2080. In many sub-Saharan African 
countries, staple food production will fall by more than 25 per cent.
l According to the World Water Commission, more than half of the major rivers of the world 
are seriously polluted.
l Over 1.4 billion people currently live in river basins where the use of water exceeds 
minimum recharge levels, leading to the desiccation of rivers and depletion of 
groundwater.
l The number of people living in water-stressed countries will increase from about 700 
million today to more than 3 billion by 2025.
l Investments in water and sanitation often have a high economic rate of return. For every 
dollar invested there is an economic return of eight dollars.
Source: Falkenmark and Rockstrom (2005); IPCC (2007a); MAR7 (2005); UNDP (2006); WHO and UNICEF (2006); 
Prüss-Üstün et al. (2008).
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assumed responsibility for determining how such services should be managed, 
and have generally adopted a regulatory approach to this based on protection, 
restrictions, controlled access and limitations on use (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; 
Tietenburg, 2000; Engel et al., 2008). While many areas of significant ecological 
importance, outstanding natural beauty and special scientific interest are being 
managed, as well as sites of interest to communities2 the current rates of land-use 
change and environmental degradation outside of these protected areas and the 
resultant harm that is being caused to local livelihoods indicate that something is 
deeply wrong.
The dominant paradigm of the 20th century was to promote economic 
development over environmental concerns, the argument being that these would 
be resolved later. In the last two decades our understanding of complex links and 
feedback loops between poverty, land-use change and environmental degradation 
have improved significantly although they are still contentiously debated. However, 
the responses to the linked problems of ecosystem degradation and poverty have 
varied greatly: from dealing with poverty and conservation as separate policy 
realms to regarding poverty as a critical constraint on conservation; from insisting 
that conservation should not compromise poverty reduction to recognising that 
poverty reduction depends on living resource conservation. While both poverty 
reduction and conservation are diverse and complex, any proposed solution to 
these two challenges that does not recognise this complexity and inter-relatedness 
is likely to fail (Adams et al., 2004). 
Some of the first examples of attempts to improve incomes while conserving 
the environment were the integrated conservation and development projects 
(ICDPs) of the late 1980s and early 90s. In general, ICDPs did not live up to these 
expectations. Most failed to achieve either their conservation or their livelihood 
improvement goals (Barrett and Arcese, 1995, Ferraro and Simpson, 2002; 
Simpson and Sedjo, 1996). Community-based natural resource management 
(CBNRM) programmes, some of them offshoots of the ICDPs, have fared somewhat 
better because they have transferred greater ownership to local people (Hulme 
and Murphree, 2001). In some instances they have also succeeded in creating 
substantial direct and indirect livelihood benefits at both community and household 
level (Binot et al., 2009).
A weakness in some of these programmes, however, is the absence of clear links 
between performance and benefits (Wunder, 2005). For example, in some southern 
African cases communities receiving wildlife revenues are under no contractual 
obligation to maintain wildlife habitat. The working assumption being that where 
2. It is estimated that 19.7 million km2 of land is currently under some form of protection (Adams et al., 
2004).
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wildlife has a comparative advantage, communities will make a collective decision 
to manage it wisely (Bond, 2001). In the Namibian CBNRM programme, however, 
the formal registration of a conservancy binds the community into land-use and 
management plans (NACSO, 2006; Jones and Murphree, 2001). In return, the 
government legally empowers the conservancy to market and derive the benefits 
from wildlife leases. Other CBNRM programmes, such as CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe, 
did have some conditions as part of the contract between rural district councils 
(RDCs), wildlife producer wards and tourism enterprises. However, for political 
reasons these conditions, particularly about land-use planning, were seldom 
enforced (Frost and Bond, 2008).
1.3 Payments for watershed services: the allure of a ‘win–win’ 
For years, environmental economists have talked about correcting for the market 
failure inherent in the management of ecosystem or environmental services. 
For public goods this means internalising the costs and benefits of supplying the 
services (Barbier and Swanson, 1992). For land-based ecosystem services, this 
means that the beneficiaries of the service provide incentives or rewards directly 
to land managers for the services received. It also implies that the providers of 
the service have secure tenure over their land, which means that they will bear or 
internalise the long-term ‘costs’ of poor management. Generically, this approach 
has been termed ‘payments for environmental services’ (PES). The innovation and 
the characteristic that differentiates PES from previous paradigms or approaches 
is that the payments are conditional or contingent on changes in land use by the 
service provider. A useful, and increasingly widely accepted, five-clause definition 
Good plan, where’s the action? Rhetoric exceeds reality so far in payments for watershed services
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is provided by Wunder (2005) who proposed that a payment for environmental 
services is: 
 
1. a voluntary transaction in which
2. a well-defined environmental service (ES) (or a land use likely to secure that service)
3. is being purchased by at least one ES buyer
4. from at least one ES provider
5. if, and only if, the ES provider ensures the supply of the ES (i.e. there is conditionality)
Each element of the definition is important since together they identify PES as a new 
approach, not simply an old one with a new label (Wunder, 2005). The voluntary 
nature of the transaction separates PES from the conventional command-and-control 
approach of many governments. Clear definition of the ecosystem service implies 
that the service can be measured, i.e. tonnes of carbon sequestered or the turbidity 
levels in water. Structuring the arrangement as a relationship between a buyer and 
an ecosystem service seller clearly defines the principles and counters the tendency 
for third parties to appropriate the financial benefits. The conditionality criterion 
(contingency) serves to separate PES from many other incentive-based resource 
management approaches. In its simplest form, it means that the payment will only 
be made when the providers of the service implement the agreed changes. It can be 
refined so that payment is scaled to performance. 
Wunder freely acknowledges that this robust definition of PES severely limits the 
number of working examples to some experienced in developed economies, ‘Costa 
Rica and a dozen other experiences, mostly in Latin America’ (Wunder, 2005). 
Importantly, he also acknowledges that the terminology associated with markets 
and market-based interventions can also be a ‘stumbling block’ to new approaches 
in environmental management (Wunder and Vargas, 2005). To overcome anti-market 
sentiments in many Asian and South American countries, PES initiatives are using an 
alternative vocabulary such as ‘compensations’ or ‘rewards’ for ecosystem services. 
While the language is different the underlying principles are not – users of ecosystem 
services are paying/rewarding or compensating service providers. For the purposes of 
this report, however, we tend to draw on the much broader definition of PES and PWS 
that stresses the presence of a water-based externality being addressed by payments 
to land users from water users (see Porras et al., 2008). 
The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) undertook the 
first global review of emerging experience with payments for environmental services, 
examining them through the two lenses of environmental protection and poverty 
reduction. The 287 examples of services examined were all perceived to be linked 
to forests in some way and fell into four main categories: carbon sequestration and 
storage; watershed protection; biodiversity protection; and landscape beauty (Landell-
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The logic of payments for ecosystem services assumes that current land-uses are the most 
profitable option available to the farmer (A)  but that these result in some off-site costs 
being incurred (B). 
The alternative landuse will only be more financially viable if the payments (A* plus C) 
raise the net incentive above the incentive for the current behaviour (A). Further, those 
suffering from the cost of the externality will only pay if this is a compelling option, i.e. 
cheaper than the current costs incurred (B>C).
The logic of payments for watershed services  
Mills and Porras, 2002). This work urged both optimism and caution about the 
‘win–win’ potential of payments and incentive systems for environmental services 
and called for special attention to be given to the potential pitfalls as well as 
opportunities facing poorer groups.
Since 2002, the concepts, language and the ‘markets’ for ecosystem services 
have changed substantially. The market for carbon sequestration payments has 
developed enormously as climate change has become increasingly widely perceived 
to be the world’s primary environmental challenge (Stern, 2006). There have been 
substantial increases in the value of the voluntary market for carbon and the 
activity in regulatory schemes, notably the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. It is now 
estimated that the total market for carbon is worth over US$125 billion (Capoor 
and Ambrosi, 2009) Carbon sequestration, unlike other ecosystem services, is not 
linked to a specific site or location. This means that northern-based carbon emitters 
Source: adapted from Wunder et al. (2008).
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currently have a greater choice as to where in the world they can offset carbon. In 
contrast watershed services, and to some extent biodiversity and landscape beauty, 
are site-specific. This limits the demand for these services as it depends on the 
presence of a willing buyer at any given site.
In some situations, it is very difficult to differentiate between different ecosystem 
services while in other situations payment for a single defined service is unlikely to 
change the incentive structure for land managers. Under these conditions, payments 
can be constructed for more than one service. This is generally known as ‘bundling’. 
Its proponents, who assume that ecosystem services are complementary, often 
oversimplify its prospects. For example, a management intervention that leads to 
greater watershed services is not automatically positive for biodiversity or landscape 
beauty – there are likely to be trade-offs between these different services (Landell-
Mills and Porras, 2002; Wunder et. al., 2008). Because of these trade-offs and the 
potential conflicts between management interventions, bundling should generally 
be approached with care. On the other had, a payment mechanism that focuses on 
only one service can, if care is not taken in design, privilege its provision over other 
ecosystem services, resulting in negative and unintended impacts. 
Payments for ecosystem services are very new additions to the toolbox of 
environmental managers, and even newer to development planners. Despite recent 
work, there is little understanding yet about when and under what circumstances 
they are best applied (Asquith and Wunder, 2008). One of the considerations is 
the degree to which the landscape has been altered. For example, in a landscape 
where there is widespread cultivation and associated agricultural infrastructure, the 
opportunity cost of reverting to its natural or indigenous vegetation is likely to be 
prohibitive. Under these circumstances payments that aim to restore forest-based 
ecosystem services are unlikely to be successful. However, if the core problem 
is with water quality, payments to land managers to utilise in-field soil-water 
conservation structures may well be appropriate. At the other end of the spectrum, 
where landscapes are largely undisturbed and there is no immediate threat, 
beneficiaries of the services may argue that there is no compelling reason for them 
to initiate payments (Wunder, 2005). 
The term ‘payments for watershed services’ (PWS) now encompasses a range of 
mechanisms by which downstream water users make payments to upstream land 
managers to change their land-use systems in order to improve water quality 
and/or water quantity, or regulate water flows (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; van 
Noordwijk et al., 2004). The use of a PWS approach by the City of New York in the 
1980s to solve water quality problems in the Catskill and Delaware catchments 
provided a high profile and very tangible example of their potential (Pires, 2004) 
(Box 2). A similar approach by Nestlé Waters to secure the quality of Perrier 
Fair deals for watershed services 17
Mineral Water served to 
confirm that PWS could be 
both successful and highly 
cost effective for the buyer 
(Déprés et al., 2005; Perrot-
Maître, 2006). Subsequently, 
similar programmes have 
been developed in China (the 
Sloping Lands Conversion 
Programme – SLCP), Mexico 
(Payment for Hydrological 
Environmental Services 
Programme – PSAH) and 
South Africa (the Working for 
Water (WfW) programme).
At the same time that the City of New York was developing its approach in the 
Catskill and Delaware catchments, Costa Rica began developing a very successful, 
PES programme at the national level. Boosted by these success stories, the 
environmental community began to explore their potential in developing countries 
(e.g., Simpson and Sedjo, 1996; Ferraro, 2001). As incipient schemes began to 
emerge in developing countries, questions about their effects for poor people began 
New York drinks clean water thanks to a PWS scheme
B
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New York City preserves the ‘champagne’ of drinking water
The New York City water system provides 9 million people with 4.5 billion litres of freshwater 
daily. Approximately 90 per cent of the water comes from the Catskills-Delaware (Cat-Del) 
catchment and is unfiltered. For many years, the water from the Cat-Del watershed was 
considered to be the ‘champagne’ of drinking waters. However, in the early 1980s its quality 
declined significantly, largely the result of intensification of agricultural practices and the 
increasing urbanisation of the area. At the same time, federal legislation (the Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 1986 and the Surface Water Drinking Rule 1989) set stringent standards on the 
quality of unfiltered water for human consumption. New York City faced building a treatment 
plant capable of processing the water at a cost of somewhere between US$4 billion and US$6 
billion with annual costs of US$250 million. However, through the New York State Department 
of Agriculture, an alternative deal was struck with farmers that revolved around the ‘whole 
farm plan’. Under the plan, New York City paid for pollution control investments on each farm, 
with an additional stipend for increased labour costs. The programme was voluntary and 
administered by the farming community through the ‘Watershed Agricultural Council’. Some 
85 per cent of the farmers were required to sign up. This was the ‘deal-maker’ for New York 
authorities – the threshold level deemed necessary to effectively reduce non-point source 
pollution. Between 1990 and 1993, 93 per cent of landholders signed up to the programme 
at a cost to New York City of the equivalent of about 11 per cent of the proposed filtration 
plant. New Yorkers have retained their champagne drinking water at a fraction of the cost 
of filtration.
Source: Appleton (2002).
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to be asked. Might such schemes marginalise poor people further, or might they do 
some good? (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002) The more optimistic scenarios projected 
a new category of poor land managers conserving landscapes, selling environmental 
services, and climbing their way out of poverty (Pagiola et al., 2002).
Schemes for payments for watershed services usually fall into one of two categories:
National programmes or schemes, generally involving payments by national or 
provincial governments, transcend the boundaries of river basins or catchments. 
These programmes tend to commit farmer and land managers to specified land-
use changes, but are seldom robustly monitored or enforced (Engel et al., 2008). 
When these changes have been made or land-use plans agreed, the farmers 
receive payment. Examples of these national-level schemes are the above-
mentioned programme in Costa Rica, plus those in China and South Africa (see 
Bennett, 2008; Turpie et al., 2008). Strictly speaking, these programmes are not 
based on market-led relationships between willing buyers and willing sellers for a 
defined watershed service. As with all government programmes they are politically 
determined and so are susceptible to changes in priorities, governments and 
budgets (Pagiola et al., 2002).
The other category of PWS schemes are those that are constructed within a basin, 
between willing buyers and willing sellers of watershed services for a defined and 
measurable service – these are also termed ‘user-defined schemes’ (Engel et al., 
2008). Generally, these schemes are premised on a compelling business case in 
which the buyer of the service gets a cost-efficient solution to a given problem. 
The above-mentioned New York City and Vittel3 cases are examples of this, as 
is the Heredia Public Service Enterprise scheme in Costa Rica. In common with 
a number of other cases that have subsequently emerged, the problem being 
addressed by these examples is ‘non-point source pollution’.4 
Subsequent sections of this report describe the efforts by IIED and its partners to 
assess the state of play with payments for watershed services internationally – how 
widespread they are and what effects they are having – and to get involved in 
various contexts to investigate, stimulate and shape emerging schemes, with better 
local livelihoods and sustainability in mind. 
3. The mineral water bottled by Nestlé originates from the ‘Grande Source’ in the town of Vittel at the 
foot of the Vosges Mountains in north-eastern France (Perrot-Maître, 2006). 
4. The difference between point and non-point pollution is critical. Payments for watershed services 
should not be used in those cases where water quality is being deliberately polluted by a single and 
controllable source.
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2  The project: action-learning
2.1 Inception phase
Following IIED’s global review of emerging practice in environmental service 
payments, including payments for watershed services (Landell-Mills and Porras, 
2002), it joined with other partners to shape and develop efforts to set up 
payments for watershed services in key countries. The project ‘Developing Markets 
for Watershed Protection Services and Improved Livelihoods’ began in October 
2001. An inception phase involved diagnostic studies in India (Sengupta et al., 
2003), South Africa (King et al., 2003), Indonesia (Munawir et al., 2003) and four 
Caribbean island states (Geoghegan et al., 2003).5 
Diagnostic studies were carried out in these countries because they were identified 
as places where payments for watershed services were beginning to be discussed 
and appeared to have significant potential. The studies covered many of the issues 
raised by the global review regarding effectiveness, equity, and impacts on the 
poor of market-based approaches for watershed services.6 Some lessons from these 
diagnostics were later drawn out and these have guided the work that has followed 
(Geoghegan, 2005) (Box 3).
2.2 Action-learning phase 
An implementation phase of the project began in late 2003 – designed and 
managed by IIED and funded by the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID). Its purpose was ‘to increase understanding of the role of market mechanisms 
in promoting the provision of watershed services to improve livelihoods’ (IIED, 
2003). Thus the emphasis was not only on mechanisms for payments from 
downstream water users to upstream land managers but on developing them in 
ways that improve livelihoods. Three broad categories of stakeholder were given 
particular attention: farmers and land managers who are supplying the watershed 
services; non-farming households resident in the area supplying the services; and 
poor households if they were required to pay for watershed services. The inception 
phase pointed strongly to the potential negative impacts of payment schemes on 
poor people’s lives wherever they are located in the watershed – downstream as 
5. These reports are available from the project website: http://www.iied.org/natural-resources/key-
issues/water/developing-markets-for-watershed-services 
6. The India diagnostic included a national overview and more detailed studies of two states, Himachal 
Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. The Indonesian study looked in detail at one area, the Segara River 
Basin. The South African diagnostic provided a national overview. The Caribbean study consisted of 
diagnostics of four islands: Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Trinidad.
Natural Resource Issues No. 1320
well as upstream, non-participants as well as participants in payment schemes – and 
hence the need for this disaggregated emphasis. 
The project expected to achieve three outputs (IIED, 2003):  
1. Action-learning processes for the development of equitable market mechanisms 
for watershed services supported in four countries.
2. Diagnostic studies, plans and preparedness established in two further countries 
wishing to adopt market mechanisms for watershed protection.
3. Knowledge of market mechanisms improved through networking, development 
of guidance, and dissemination of information with other countries and 
institutions.
Through this ‘action-learning’ approach, the project sought to actively engage in the 
process of developing payments for watershed services and to learn from actions 
taken. The project thus aimed to focus on the tangible problems and complex 
B
ox
 3
Country diagnostics of potential for payments for watershed services: 
some common findings
Diagnostic studies in India, South Africa, Indonesia and the Caribbean focused on assessing 
key watershed management issues and needs, potential market actors (beneficiaries and 
providers of watershed services), the policy and institutional context, and interest in and 
demand for market-based approaches. 
Despite the wide diversity of biophysical, cultural and economic contexts there was 
consistency in the challenges faced by watershed managers and their responses. None of the 
diagnostics revealed tangible mechanisms linking stakeholders in the upper catchments with 
their counterparts downstream. This meant that there was little opportunity for upstream 
actors to recover the costs of wise land management from the beneficiaries of these practices. 
However, some of the diagnostics did highlight the presence of various financial and non-
financial incentives for watershed management.
The diagnostics collectively spell out major challenges to developing market mechanisms for 
watershed services, especially in the commonly identified situation where there is:
l Limited evident demand from potential buyers of watershed services.
l Little clarity over the desired land use to support or generate watershed services.
l Poor understanding of how payments would be captured and translated into ‘good 
management’.
l An absence of cost-effective, reliable and accurate monitoring. 
All the diagnostics concluded, however, that there was widespread interest and some 
potential for further exploring facilitation of payments for watershed services.
Source: Geoghegan (2005).
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realities of watershed management in ‘real time’ (the actual time it takes a process 
to occur) and to draw lessons from this. While this action-learning was focused in 
four main countries, further diagnostics in two more countries and international 
capability-building were equally important outputs. ‘Action-learning’ nevertheless 
became the methodological approach for the project as a whole. A core team of 
IIED staff with mixed skills, expertise and regional knowledge was put together to 
guide the project. 
2.2.1 Action-learning in India, Indonesia, South Africa and the Caribbean 
The knowledge and experience gained by IIED’s partners in the diagnostic work, 
and the momentum amongst stakeholders to explore PWS-type solutions, provided 
a platform from which to initiate the action-learning approach in India, Indonesia, 
South Africa and selected countries in the Caribbean. The structure and methods of 
the project in each of the countries reflected the unique circumstances within that 
country and at the chosen sites. Nevertheless, between the countries, there was a 
common approach that involved:
l A core research team: a lead partner institution, well-placed in terms of 
track-record, contacts, field connections, interest and capability convened a 
small team in each country. The teams consisted of varying mixes of relevant 
expertise from different institutions. In order to establish a field presence within 
the selected action-learning sites, additional partnerships between the core 
research team and local field-based organisations were developed in each of the 
countries (see Appendix 1). 
l Site selection: the diagnostic studies enabled potential sites to be identified 
and preference criteria were used by each research team to select the case 
study areas from the larger pool of sites. At some sites in India and Indonesia 
the research teams were able to work together with ongoing watershed 
conservation and/or development initiatives. In the remaining sites, such as 
the Ga-Selati River in South Africa, there were no obvious partners or ongoing 
processes and the challenge of facilitating payments for watershed protection 
services had to be started from scratch.
l Baseline studies: at most of the selected sites baseline studies on livelihoods, 
land use, and hydrology were undertaken. The purpose of these studies was to 
identify the livelihoods challenges and opportunities, document current land use, 
and identify the core problems and potential interventions. These studies were 
context-specific – seeking different degrees of participation with stakeholders, 
depending on the scale of the issues and the skills available.
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l Learning groups: an essential component of action-learning as a methodology 
is that the participants and stakeholders take time to reflect on the process, 
to question, and to seek to understand lessons learned (Dick, 1997; Sayer and 
Campbell, 2003). In each country, IIED and partners constituted learning groups 
that typically comprised a range of stakeholders from government, civil society 
and, where possible, the private sector. For those stakeholder groups difficult to 
engage with through the learning groups, partners used combinations of targeted 
seminars, exchange visits and site-specific interactions.
l Applied research and analysis: to support both the site-level and learning group 
work, the research teams identified key issues and problems that needed to be 
addressed. Typically this led to the development of short, commissioned reports 
– such as reviews of the legal framework for payments for watershed services in 
India and South Africa.7 
Ten sites were selected as action-learning sites (see Table 1), including the Rio 
Los Negros site from Bolivia. Although Bolivia was formally a diagnostic country 
(see Section 2.2.2) the implementation of a PWS scheme by Fundación Natura 
at Los Negros provided the project with an additional action-learning site. The 
sites exhibited considerable diversity in terms of their spatial scale, context, and 
the perceived core problems (see Appendix 2). The diversity of the sites provided 
the project with the opportunity to test different approaches to a wide variety of 
problems. Conversely, it also presented IIED and partners with a major challenge to 
effectively synthesise the experience and extract the lessons learned from the core-
teams’ experience within each site and to disseminate these to a wider audience.
An effective and enduring PWS arrangement is 
based on identifying a clear cause and effect 
relationship between upstream land use and 
downstream water needs (Engel et al., 2008; 
IUCN, 2006; Wunder, 2005). In essence, it is 
necessary to identify the core problem of the 
water users and the land-use change that will 
lead to its resolution. Engel et al. (2008) point 
out that it is essential that not only are the land-
use/water relationships understood, but that 
the problem affects people and water who live 
further downstream, i.e. the impacts on the water users is an externality caused by 
land use. Only when this condition is fulfilled is a PWS solution appropriate.
7. Selected background papers are available as working papers from http://www.iied.org/natural-
resources/key-issues/water/developing-markets-for-watershed-services
Should I pay people upstream for 
this? Water user in Indonesia
Ph
ot
o:
 I
IE
D
Fair deals for watershed services 23
Ta
bl
e 
1
Co
un
tr
y
W
at
er
sh
ed
/
ca
tc
h
m
en
t
A
re
a
Co
re
 p
ro
bl
em
Se
rv
ic
es
La
nd
-u
se
 c
ha
ng
e
B
uy
er
(s
)
In
di
a
B
ho
j W
et
la
nd
s,
 
M
ad
hy
a 
Pr
ad
es
h 
st
at
e
36
1 
km
2
H
ig
h 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
ag
ro
-c
he
m
ic
al
s 
in
 
B
ho
j W
et
la
nd
s 
an
d 
la
ke
W
at
er
 q
ua
lit
y
Sw
itc
h 
to
 o
rg
an
ic
 
fa
rm
in
g 
pr
ac
ti
ce
s
Po
ss
ib
le
: B
ho
pa
l M
un
ic
ip
al
 
Co
un
ci
l, 
co
rp
or
at
e 
bo
di
es
, 
pu
bl
ic
B
ho
di
-S
ua
n,
 H
im
ac
ha
l 
Pr
ad
es
h 
st
at
e
7 
km
2
So
il 
er
os
io
n 
an
d 
si
lt
at
io
n 
of
 
pr
op
os
ed
 d
am
 a
nd
 lo
w
 d
ry
 
se
as
on
 f
lo
w
s
W
at
er
 q
ua
lit
y 
an
d 
qu
an
ti
ty
So
il 
co
ns
er
va
ti
on
 a
nd
 
zo
ni
ng
Po
ss
ib
le
: I
nt
er
-v
ill
ag
e 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
Ku
ha
n,
 H
im
ac
ha
l 
Pr
ad
es
h
4-
5 
km
2
So
il 
er
os
io
n 
an
d 
si
lt
at
io
n 
of
 d
am
W
at
er
 q
ua
lit
y
So
il 
co
ns
er
va
ti
on
 a
nd
 
zo
ni
ng
In
te
r-
vi
lla
ge
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
In
do
ne
si
a
B
ra
nt
as
, E
as
t 
Ja
va
 
pr
ov
in
ce
12
,0
00
 k
m
2
D
ef
or
es
ta
ti
on
 c
au
si
ng
 e
ro
si
on
 
an
d 
si
lt
at
io
n 
of
 B
ra
nt
as
 R
iv
er
W
at
er
 q
ua
lit
y
Tr
ee
 p
la
nt
in
g 
at
 p
ilo
t 
si
te
s
PJ
T1
 -
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
ri
ve
r 
ba
si
n 
au
th
or
it
y
Ci
da
na
u,
 B
an
te
n 
pr
ov
in
ce
22
6 
km
2
Er
os
io
n 
ca
us
in
g 
hi
gh
 s
ilt
 a
nd
 
in
or
ga
ni
c 
ch
em
ic
al
 lo
ad
s
W
at
er
 q
ua
lit
y
Tr
ee
 p
la
nt
in
g 
at
 p
ilo
t 
si
te
s
KT
I g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
ow
ne
d 
in
du
st
ri
al
 c
on
gl
om
er
at
e
Ja
m
ai
ca
B
uf
f 
B
ay
/
Pe
nc
ar
20
2 
km
2  
Co
nt
am
in
at
io
n 
du
e 
to
 p
es
ti
ci
de
s 
fe
rt
ili
se
rs
 a
nd
 s
ew
ag
e
W
at
er
 q
ua
lit
y
Re
du
ce
d 
co
nt
am
in
at
io
n 
fr
om
 a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 a
nd
 
se
tt
le
m
en
t
Po
te
nt
ia
lly
 w
at
er
 c
on
su
m
er
s 
in
 c
oa
st
al
 a
re
as
Sa
in
t 
Lu
ci
a
Ta
lv
an
3,
2 
km
2
H
ig
h 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
po
llu
ti
on
W
at
er
 q
ua
lit
y
Re
du
ce
d 
co
nt
am
in
at
io
n 
fr
om
 h
um
an
 e
ff
lu
en
t 
Po
te
nt
ia
lly
 w
at
er
 a
nd
 
se
w
er
ag
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 a
nd
 
co
ns
um
er
s
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
a
Sa
bi
e-
Sa
nd
, 
M
pu
m
al
an
ga
 P
ro
vi
nc
e
7,
36
1 
km
2
Re
du
ce
d 
st
re
am
fl
ow
 c
au
se
d 
by
 in
va
si
ve
 a
lie
n 
sp
ec
ie
s 
in
 
m
on
ta
ne
 g
ra
ss
la
nd
s.
W
at
er
 
qu
an
ti
ty
 a
nd
 
qu
al
it
y
Si
te
-s
pe
ci
fi
c
N
ot
 d
ev
el
op
ed
G
a-
Se
la
ti
, L
im
po
po
 
Pr
ov
in
ce
2,
33
8 
km
2
D
ec
re
as
in
g 
st
re
am
fl
ow
 in
 u
pp
er
 
G
a-
Se
la
ti 
Ri
ve
r 
du
e 
to
 a
lie
n 
in
va
si
ve
 s
pe
ci
es
 a
nd
 in
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
ir
ri
ga
ti
on
 m
et
ho
ds
.
W
at
er
 
qu
an
ti
ty
Re
m
ov
al
 o
f 
al
ie
n 
in
va
si
ve
 s
pe
ci
es
. 
Im
pr
ov
ed
 ir
ri
ga
ti
on
 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
Po
te
nt
ia
lly
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
 
fa
rm
er
s 
an
d 
m
in
in
g 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 a
t 
Ph
al
ab
or
w
a
B
ol
iv
ia
Ri
o 
Lo
s 
N
eg
ro
s 
w
at
er
sh
ed
, S
an
ta
 C
ru
z 
de
pa
rt
m
en
t
25
0 
km
2
Ch
an
gi
ng
 la
nd
 u
se
 r
ed
uc
in
g 
w
at
er
 q
ua
nt
it
y
W
at
er
 
qu
an
ti
ty
M
ai
nt
ai
n 
fo
re
st
 c
ov
er
Co
m
m
er
ci
al
 h
or
ti
cu
lt
ur
al
 
pr
od
uc
er
s 
in
 L
os
 N
eg
ro
s 
to
w
n
Su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 p
ro
je
ct
 s
it
es
, 
co
re
 p
ro
bl
em
s,
 w
at
er
sh
ed
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
an
d 
bu
ye
rs
Natural Resource Issues No. 1324
At six of the ten sites (Table 2), the core problems being addressed by the project 
are primarily concerned with water quality. Of these, four are focused on silt loads 
and erosion while the others are concerned with agricultural chemicals, effluent and 
bacteria. The Ga-Selati River in South Africa was the only site where water quantity 
was a specific focus. In the Caribbean sites it was difficult to disaggregate the 
watershed services – water quality, flood control, biodiversity and landscape beauty 
all contribute to the ‘watershed service’.
The emphasis on water quality (six sites) rather 
than quantity (one site) is important, given that 
much of the international policy debate around 
payments for watershed services and land 
use has tended to emphasise water quantity 
rather than water quality (see Calder, 1999 and 
2005; Bruijnzeel, 2004; The Economist, 2005). 
However, two of the most frequently cited 
PWS success stories, New York and the Vittel 
Catchment, both dealt with actual or potential water quality issues. This suggests 
that generalisations in approach to developing PWS initiatives and blueprint 
approaches to changes in land management (e.g. tree planting) are of limited value. 
2.2.2 Diagnostic studies in Bolivia and China
Action-learning activities were complemented with further diagnostic studies carried 
out in Bolivia and China. These two countries were selected from a potential shortlist 
(Peru, Bolivia, China, Mexico, Vietnam and the Philippines) against a range of criteria 
(possible collaborators, stakeholder demand, presence of major learning opportunity, 
value-added, timeliness and potential influence, data availability, and partner’s 
capacity and enthusiasm). These diagnostics added to those in the inception phase 
and built on the earlier work, drawing lessons from actual cases (and on the work of 
others offering guidance based on economic theory) by engaging in real-life contexts 
to examine how payment mechanisms might usefully be inserted into complex and 
multi-level management, institutional and policy structures.
As in the action-learning countries, IIED and a locally based organisation formed 
the core research team for the diagnostic studies. The focus of the work in the two 
countries was quite different but in each case the work was more detailed than in 
the previous phase of the project.
In China, the government is applying diverse potential solutions to the country’s 
significant environmental problems, including payments for adopting specified land-
use practices (Jianguo Lui and Diamond, 2005). The underlying hypothesis for the 
diagnostic study was that the fiscal and political burden of current public payments 
Working out what to measure: participants 
in the Kuhan PWS scheme in India
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for watershed services will not be sustainable (Li et al., 2007). Using a combination 
of national reviews and local case studies the team looked at what other options or 
complements to such publicly funded payment programmes might exist. 
In Bolivia, buying and selling environmental goods and services is a particularly 
sensitive political issue (Robertson and Wunder, 2005). Here, as in many developing 
countries and even before the Morales8 government sharpened the focus on these 
tensions, ‘markets’ can have negative connotations for many. ‘The market’ tends 
to be closely associated with the negative impacts of globalisation and economic 
structural adjustment programmes advocated by western-based organisations, 
particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Wunder and Vargas, 
2005). Nevertheless, Bolivia is facing severe land-use and water problems, and some 
stakeholders consider it important that payments for watershed services be explored 
8. In 2005, Juan Evo Morales was elected as Bolivia’s first fully indigenous head of state since the 
Spanish Conquest. As the leader of the Movement towards Socialism (MAS), Morales was involved in 
the Cochabamba protests about water rights.  
Countries with action learning sites and diagnostic studies in this project
* The project’s work in China focused on policy analysis and there were no specific action learning field sites.
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(Asquith and Vargas, 2007). Like the Chinese diagnostic study, the Bolivian study 
combines national-level reviews and analyses with local-level case studies in an 
attempt to influence the development of effective and pro-poor government policy 
affecting watersheds. Fundación Natura in Bolivia, the leader of the study, is also 
responsible for facilitating a nascent PWS scheme in the Rio Los Negros watershed. 
The inclusion of the Bolivia diagnostic thus gave the project and its partners the 
opportunity to learn from this site.  
2.2.3 International networking, case review, guidance and dissemination 
Since the publication of the global review (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002), IIED 
has been part of a community interested in the potential for, and likely problems 
associated with, marketing environmental services. Output Three of the project (see 
page 22) focused on networking, continuing international case studies review, and 
the dissemination of information and lessons learned. 
Starting in 2006, IIED repeated the global review of payments for watershed 
services initiatives, this time coming up with a sample of 123 initiatives in 
developing countries (which included some of the 61 PWS case studies in the wider 
review of 287 case studies of PES by Landell-Mills and Porras in 2002). Case studies 
were selected for the sample if there was evidence of: voluntary payments; at least 
one buyer and one seller of watershed services; and payments being made on 
the condition of land-use change. A desirable, but not binding, condition was that 
private sector stakeholders were paying for ‘public goods’ or that the payments 
were being made from new sources of ‘public funds’. Of the 123 cases examined, 
75 were excluded from the statistics because they were either borderline in terms 
of PWS definition or there was insufficient information in the public domain to 
include them in the final analysis (Porras et al., 2008).
A Project Advisory Group of key individuals from this international community plus 
some of the project team met three times during the project and communicated 
actively throughout the process of action-learning amongst the project partners. 
Two external advisors, Dr. Bhaskar Vira9 and Professor Peter Frost10, played 
particularly important roles in questioning and interrogating the results of the 
project throughout. This was necessary to reduce the confirmation bias that resulted 
from the country teams being both advocates for PWS approaches and evaluators of 
the results (Sayer, 2007). 
The project sponsored and co-sponsored several important events, exchange visits 
and communication tools. These included: 
9. Department of Geography, University of Cambridge. 
10. Formerly of the University of Zimbabwe and now part time for CIFOR.
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l A joint workshop on PES co-
sponsored by the Center for 
International Forestry Research 
(CIFOR) and the Center for 
Development Research (ZEF) in 
Germany.11
l A learning event in Bellagio, 
Italy, of key international players 
to capture and share current 
thinking on PWS.12
l Production of a documentary 
film on payments for watershed 
services that was broadcast on 
BBC World.13
l The production and dissemination 
of a regular electronic bulletin, 
Flows.14
l A facilitated visit by project partners to PES programmes in Costa Rica that was 
particularly effective at generating ideas that have subsequently stimulated 
further decisions and policy in the partner countries (Porras and Miranda, 2006).
2.3 Reflections on the project’s approach
The rest of this report is about the findings and lessons learned from the project 
in developing payments for watershed services. In this sub-section we take the 
opportunity to reflect on the validity of the project’s approach, the robustness of 
the underlying concept, the performance of IIED in executing the project, and the 
extent to which the project has contributed to the ongoing global debate about 
payments for watershed services. While action-learning methodologies have many 
advantages there are no control sites. Thus the outcome of this project is to some 
extent dependent on the skills, experience and personalities of those people 
11. The presentations from this workshop form the bulk of the Special Issue of Ecological Economics 
(2008) titled ‘Payments for Environmental Services in Developing and Developed Countries’ (Volume 
65, Issue 4, May 2008), editors: Sven Wunder, Stefanie Engel and Stefano Pagiola. 
12. This has been presented as Payments for Watershed Service: The Bellagio Conversations, editors: 
Nigel Asquith and Sven Wunder. See: http://www.naturabolivia.org/Informacion/The%20Bellagio%20
Conversations%20FINAL%202.pdf  
13. ‘Shed Loads – paying to protect watersheds’ was broadcast five times on BBC World in September 
2005. A Spanish version was produced for dissemination in Central and South America and a Bahasa 
Indonesian version for Indonesia. Material from the Bhoj Wetlands in Madhya Pradesh was used by the 
Indian team to produce another film, ‘Lake Matters’.  
14. Flows is a regular bulletin aimed at summarising and disseminating research work and stimulating 
ideas and communication between people developing and implementing PWS mechanisms. It has 
been jointly supported by IIED and the World Bank.
A China-Caribbean partnership – sharing experience 
is critical for developing PWS
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involved. It is a moot point whether a different set of actors would have produced 
the same set of results.
The project was independently evaluated in late 2006 and early 2007. The 
evaluation was based on a review of documentation, field visits, and extensive 
interview and questionnaire responses from those connected to the project, with 
knowledge of it, or working in the PES field (Sayer, 2007).15
Sayer noted that: ‘This project was initiated at a time when there was a wave 
of interest in PES/PWS amongst international environmental organisations, 
governments and intergovernmental processes. PES was, and in some quarters 
still is, being promoted as a major response to dealing with the linked problems of 
alleviating rural poverty and conserving global environmental values. There was 
a need to acquire evidence on the real potential of the approach to be effective 
on the ground. The project responded to this need and has been the major 
international initiative to move beyond advocacy and speculation. [It] has made a 
major contribution to instilling a sense of reality into the debate.’
The evaluation report concluded that ‘action-learning, of the type supported by this 
project, would be very valuable in helping to define where and when PES/PWS are 
appropriate and helping to establish the underlying conditions for these mechanisms 
to realise their potential impact. A “community of practice” has been built and a 
number of the local partners have embarked upon valuable watershed conservation 
programmes. The potential for future impact is great’ (Sayer, 2007).  
IIED recognises the importance of continuity in the processes that it has been 
involved in starting. The PWS team remains involved in networks of PWS 
practitioners and – to the extent possible – engaged in the sites and with many of 
the project’s partners. Follow-up investigations as to the durability of the changes 
observed are being planned and the results will be published as working papers and 
made available on the website.
The impact of the project at a policy level is more difficult to assess. We know that:
l The Chinese government has adopted PES principles as part of its latest five-year 
economic plan.
l In South Africa, a water pricing strategy has created a trading arena for watershed 
ecosystem services. 
l In Bolivia the Sustainable Development Secretary in the Santa Cruz department 
15. This independent project evaluation is available from http://www.iied.org/natural-resources/key-
issues/water/developing-markets-for-watershed-services
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For each issue the evaluator has given a score: 10 represents the highest score and zero the lowest possible score.
Issue Score Comment
The concept, design and execution of the project
Project concept and 
quality at entry
9 The basic ideas underlying the project and its approach were 
excellent 
The design of the 
project
7 Action-learning through mentoring of local partners was the best 
approach – the project was over-ambitious in terms of what could be 
achieved in three years
The concept and 
practice of action 
research
8 Testing ideas in real-life field situations was essential. More 
structured scientific methods might have been used
IIED’s approach 
and comparative 
advantage
9 IIED performed well in guiding the field work without imposing 
external assumptions or prejudices
Choice of partner 
countries and IIED’s 
history of involvement
8 The countries chosen covered an interesting range of situations and 
included some where IIED had considerable experience and two that 
were new 
Action research design 7 There was not enough investment in developing typologies, 
clarifying concepts and terms and giving structure to data collection
Technical 
backstopping by IIED
7 Administrative and process backstopping were of a high quality 
– there was not enough specialist technical support provided to 
some countries
Scientific methods 
– tools
5 Some potential for learning was lost through the absence of a more 
rigorous conceptual and methodological framework
PWS models 
considered
7 The range of approaches to PWS considered appears with hindsight 
to have been too limited – but the project was too short to make 
changes 
Site selection within 
countries
7 Sites selected were not always optimal, more investment in 
establishing criteria at project inception might have yielded better 
choices
Links with the 
diagnostic phase
8 The project activities flowed nicely from the diagnostic phase that 
had proceeded.
Summary findings of an independent evaluation of the project: ‘Developing 
markets for watershed protection services and improved livelihoods’ 
has announced a new environmental policy for the department’s 32 million 
hectares, with a strong emphasis on PES.
l In India, the new forest policy in the state of Himachal Pradesh emphasises 
market-based mechanisms to environmental services, and the state is starting 
large-scale pilots.
The project and its activities appear to have contributed to these decisions, but they 
are unlikely to be solely as a result of these.
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The need for rigorous 
outcomes measures
5 A more rigorous system for assessing outcomes in terms of poverty 
alleviation and watershed performance at learning sites would have 
been desirable but probably not feasible with the budget and the 
duration of the project
Confirmation bias 8 The project was commendable in being rigorous and honest in the 
interpretation of its results 
The risks of 
downplaying the 
need for zoning and 
regulation
6 The PWS debate risks diverting attention from more classic 
regulatory approaches to watershed protection; Bolivia, Indonesia 
and the Caribbean may have given insufficient attention to these 
conventional approaches
Project leadership 9 The quality of leadership provided by IIED was high
Continuity of staffing 8 Again the ability of IIED staff to manage changes in field partners’ 
staffing was commendable
Communications and dissemination of results
Communications 
amongst partners and 
cross site visits
8 Partners communicated well – an opportunity was lost in not having 
more meetings on-site in partner countries
Action-learning groups 
and national learning
8 A strong part of the project – this worked well
Reporting of results 7 Too many general and descriptive reports and not – yet – enough 
synthetic and targeted ones
FLOWS 8 A valuable web-based newsletter
Web-sites 7 Some excellent, others more difficult to access for comprehensive 
information
Peer-reviewed journal 
articles
5 Still time to rectify this but it would be good to put the key findings 
in the refereed literature
IIED’s profile in the 
international policy 
dialogue
8 IIED is amongst the international leaders on PES/PWS innovations 
– it may not have the international recognition that its PWS work 
would merit 
‘Shed Loads’ 8 A valuable film that got television coverage for the project but 
potential not fully exploited, although this and ‛Lake Matters’ had 
good impacts in India
Comparison with 
other PWS initiatives
8 The most credible international initiative in this field
Impact on global 
policy discourse
8 Significant impact – but in a low profile way. Participation of national 
partners in international events was a major potential source of 
impact
Impact in participating 
countries
9 In every country the IIED activities have been highly influential in 
the national policy discourse
Exit strategies and 
continued support to 
national partners
7 The project did not have an explicit exit strategy, there was an 
assumption that support to national partners would continue. 
National partners have the potential to deliver significant impact and 
the learning network created by this project needs to be maintained
Source: Sayer (2007).
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3  Findings and discussion
The project’s findings are presented in two sections. Section 3.1 covers findings from 
the action-learning sites with supporting evidence from the diagnostic countries. 
Section 3.2 highlights the main findings from the analysis of 50 cases across 
developing countries. 
3.1 Country- and site-level findings
The site-level descriptions (Table 1) highlight the diversity of contexts and the 
activities that were carried out by the action-learning teams. The action-learning 
approach allowed each team and their local partners to tailor their activities to 
the scale and conditions of the site. This provided the opportunity to adapt plans 
in response to local opportunities and challenges, within the broad framework 
provided by the overall project. It is important to note that our project did not select 
a random set of watersheds, but worked in selected sites that were identified as 
having potential to develop a PWS mechanism. As the individual country studies in 
the Caribbean and Bolivia have shown there are many watersheds where there is no 
immediate prospect of a buyer and therefore little chance of addressing problems 
through a PWS mechanism (Asquith et al., 2007, McIntosh and Leotaud, 2007). 
3.1.1 Payments and payment mechanisms developed
In each of the action-learning sites the focus of the work has been on facilitating 
direct payments between suppliers and buyers of watershed services. In three of 
the ten sites the project facilitated new financial relationships between suppliers 
of watershed services and downstream buyers (Boxes 4 to 7). These arrangements 
were developed in the inter-village site of Kuhan in Himachal Pradesh, India, and 
the pilot sites in the Brantas and Cidanau watersheds in Indonesia. At a fourth site, 
Rio Los Negros in Bolivia, the project has contributed to a strengthening of a nascent 
payment scheme that was developed by Fundación Natura before the current phase 
of the project began. 
The payments at these four sites must be seen and evaluated in terms of the scale 
and the context of the catchments. By any measure, these payment mechanisms 
are pilot interventions, taking place within much larger, dynamic and complex 
catchments. On their own, and in their current form, they are unlikely to have any 
significant impact on the core biophysical problems that have been identified by the 
stakeholders and the research teams. However, in each case they do represent a new 
relationship between downstream users of water and upstream land managers. As 
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Rio Los Negros, Bolivia – beehives and barbed wire
Within the Los Negros catchment in Bolivia, the NGO Fundación Natura is using external 
funding sources to facilitate payments between upstream and downstream farmers in the 
Santa Rosa community, covering some 250 km2 within the catchment. Farmers who agree 
not to extend their area of cultivation into the cloud forest are provided with one beehive 
for every ten hectares of forest conserved. In the second year of operation, the farmers 
requested and received barbed wire instead of beehives. The external funds used to buy 
the beehives and the barbed wire have been supplemented by two payments from the local 
municipality. 
l Action: agreement not to extend cultivation into 2,000 ha of montane cloud forest.
l Payment: external funds from USFWS (donor), supplemented by a payment of US3,500 
from the local municipality, have been used to prime the agreement.
l Verification: through Fundación Natura.
l Other: some 34 upland subsistence agro-pastoralist farmers are involved to date, with 
numbers doubling in each of the last two years. Transaction costs estimated to be 
US$23,000 for three years.
One of the greatest challenges, but also one of the most important benefits of the programme, 
has been to build trust between all the stakeholders in the Los Negros catchment.
Source: Asquith and Vargas (2007).
such, they represent a new way of doing business in each catchment, albeit at a 
very small scale.
The project design implicitly assumed that the core teams would be able to engage, 
strengthen, and support ongoing PWS mechanisms, which would have allowed 
robust lessons on their impacts and effectiveness (Sayer, 2007). In three out of the 
four sites, where PWS relationships were developed and strengthened, the project 
was able to engage with ongoing processes whose origins pre-dated the project. It 
is important to note that these processes were not previously aimed at developing 
a PWS instrument. For example, the process at Kuhan benefited considerably from 
the work done by the Changar Project,16 which meant that there were functional 
village development committees and ongoing conversations about land use, 
conservation, and water management (Agarwal et al., 2008). In contrast,  the core 
teams at other project sites (for example the Ga-Selati and Sabi-Sand rivers in South 
Africa as well as the Bhoj Wetlands in India) had to start by developing relationships 
and building organisations, as well as having to collect and analyse the data 
necessary to begin facilitating a PWS scheme. 
16. The Changar Project was jointly funded by the Indian and German governments. The project focused 
on watershed treatment and livelihood enhancement in 37 micro-watersheds that were further sub-
divided into mini-micro watersheds in the Changar region of Himachal Pradesh (Agarwal et al., 2008).
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In part this highlights the importance of functional community-based organisations 
(CBOs) as a precursor to the success of innovative instruments like PWS. Without 
effective CBOs – such as farmers’ groups or village development committees – it 
is very difficult to introduce new concepts, especially within the time constraints 
faced by a project of this sort. It is even harder in developing countries where the 
landholdings are small and there are more people per hectare to interact with and 
transaction costs of individual interaction may be prohibitive. Trust between the 
intermediaries and the existing CBOs is also important. Where trust exists it can 
reduce the time needed to introduce, modify and implement innovative relationships 
between stakeholders (see Wunder, 2005). 
In three of the four sites where payments were made, watershed service buyers 
located within the watershed. In the fourth, Los Negros, the donor funds used to 
‘prime’ the relationship are complemented by money from the local municipality17 
(Asquith and Vargas, 2007). Monitoring and contingency are being enforced in three 
sites, the exception being Brantas where PJT1 (the government management body 
for the Brantas catchment) has made a one-off payment. In three of the cases where 
there has been a financial transaction, the NGO facilitators have also acted as the 
intermediaries for the payments. In Kuhan, where the payment has been made ‘in 
kind’, there has been no need for an intermediary to act between the two villages.
17. The external donor was the United States Department of Fish and Wildlife (USDFW). No project funds 
were used to ‘prime’ PWS relationships in this project.
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Kuhan micro-catchment, India – saplings for silt control
Within the Kuhan catchment in Himachal Pradesh, the core problem is the high silt load 
due to erosion in the upper part of the catchment. The source of the silt was identified as 
a degraded area of land (approximately 12 hectares) used for grazing. An agreement was 
facilitated between the two village development committees to rehabilitate this land. The 
final agreement included:
l Action: closure and replanting of a degraded grazing area of 12.1 ha by 21 families in the 
upstream village of Oach Kalan, for a period of up to eight years.
l Payment: 330 seedlings financed from irrigation charges provided and transported by 
buyers (downstream village of Kuhan Khas), as well as agreement over the future use and 
rights over trees and grass.
l Verification: The agreement is being monitored jointly by the development committee of 
each village.
l Other: compensation mechanisms if the terms of the agreement are broken.
A further set of activities was developed during the ongoing negotiations, which focused 
on the construction of brushwood check dams on the sub-streams that flow into the major 
stream between the two villages. A further action, yet to be implemented, is planting 
bamboo in streams to trap and reduce silt levels.
Source: Agarwal et al. (2008).
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The logic of PWS suggests that payments need to be regular and sustained in order 
to ensure that the sellers do not revert to previous, less desirable land-use practices 
(Wunder, 2005). This is also referred to as ‘permanence’ and has been identified 
in other reviews of PWS (Wunder et al., 2008). In our project case, some of the 
mechanisms developed to date in the sites will not last much beyond the timeframe 
of the project. For example, while the grazing exclusion in Kuhan catchment has 
been agreed for eight years, the 300 saplings that formed the payment was a ‘one 
off’ payment. Only time will tell whether the agreement will be honoured for the 
full eight years by the upstream farmers. Since its implementation, the upstream 
farmers have been able to harvest more grass while downstream the membership 
of the irrigation group has increased from 8 to 50 families.
In the Indonesian sites the current contracts are for between three and five years 
but with an option to renew. Regular payments have been made in both the 
Cidanau and Brantas sites. Payments are conditional upon the previously agreed 
targets of the number of trees planted being met. Additionally, at the Brantas 
site the conditionality has been extended to the survival of seedlings and the 
maintenance of the terraces.
B
ox
 6
Brantas River catchment, Indonesia – cash and access to springs
The Brantas River is 320 km long, draining a catchment of 12,000 km2. The core problem is 
the sedimentation of dams. Volcanic eruptions account for 44 per cent of the sediment while 
a further 40 per cent stems from landslides due to the unstable geology of the catchment.18 
An estimated 16 per cent of sediment is from erosion primarily due to dryland cultivation 
and illegal logging on steep slopes. A pilot payment mechanism was developed between 
PJT1 and small-scale farmers in a critical upland area – Tlekung (66 farmers) and Bendosari 
(77 farmers).
l Action: tree planting on 40 ha of critical land in two villages as well as construction of 
terracing. 
l Payment: US$5,800 from PJT1 over a three-year period with an option to renew the 
contract. Support from District Forest Office for nursery and a licence to access and 
manage six springs from the state-owned forestry company.
l Verification: through YPP, a locally based NGO, but payments are made on condition that 
targets for planting and survival are met.
l Other: a third farmers’ group has voluntarily joined the scheme - Sukomulyo (27 farmers).
Although the direct incentives to participate in the payment scheme were relatively small, 
the facilitators note that the importance of unrestricted, albeit small, funding is sufficient to 
attract others to the programme.
Source: Munawir and Vermeulen (2007).
18. In 2007 a massive mud flow was triggered by oil exploration near the city of Surabay, in the 
Brantas River catchment. In an effort to divert the mud, some of it has been diverted into the lower 
reaches of the Brantas River (see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7699672.stm).
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The arrangements facilitated by Fundación Natura in Bolivia centre on regular 
payments – farmers receive one beehive for every ten hectares of forest conserved 
per annum. The NGO used donor money to make compensation payments while 
the initiative was developed, but only until a fund was set up by the downstream 
water cooperative and the municipal government (Le Tellier et al., 2009). Local 
resources, including an earmarked 9 per cent increase in water rates, are now 
generating most of the direct payments to upstream landowners
In all project sites it can be said that the buyers and sellers are engaged in 
experiments – and that their commitment to develop and sustain the initiatives 
depends on the outcome of their experience. In all cases these new relationships 
have been characterised by a level of enthusiasm and optimism that exceeds the 
financial scale of the transactions (Agarwal et al., 2008). In the short term it is 
likely that the participants will continue to adapt and modify their relationships. 
The prognosis for the relationships in the medium to long term is unclear and will 
depend largely on the perceived outcomes by the stakeholders. The spontaneous 
request by the 27 farmers of Sukomulyo village in the Brantas to be included in 
the nascent scheme is the only tangible evidence of replication within the sites 
(Munawir and Vermeulen, 2007). 
B
ox
 7
Cidanau catchment, Indonesia – cash for erosion-blocking trees
Erosion is causing massive sedimentation problems within reservoirs on the river in the 
Cidanau watershed in Indonesia. Soil loss through erosion within the catchment is estimated 
to be in the order of 146 tonnes per hectare per annum, with an estimated 479,500 tonnes 
of sediment being deposited in the river annually. The turbidity of the water in the river has 
increased 14-fold between 1999 and 2005. High nutrient loads combine with the sediment 
to block waterways and pumping stations. A pilot payment mechanism was developed 
through the Cidanau Catchment Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi DAS Cidanau 
– FKDC) between PT Krakatau Tirta Industri (PT KTI), an industrial conglomerate, and two 
farmers groups from the villages of Citamen (43 farmers) and Cibojong (29 farmers). The final 
agreement reached was:
l Action: replanting 50 ha of critical land.19
l Payment: each farmers group receives US$80 for every 500 trees planted. Total value of 
the agreement is about US$32,500 over five years. 
l Verification: payment is conditional upon planting and the maintenance of previous 
seedlings. An ad hoc team formed by the FKDC is responsible for verification of the 
agreement. However, the intention is to form a permanent committee.
FKDC was a trusted and known facilitator to both KTI and the farmers groups. If it had not 
been present and well known to all the key stakeholders it is very unlikely that this payment 
mechanism could have been developed in the time available.
Source: Munawir and Vermeulen (2007).
19. In Indonesia critical land is defined by its slope and susceptibility to erosion as predicted by the 
Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE).
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Where activities have been started as pilots, it is important to question whether 
they can either be replicated or scaled up. Replication implies that the pilot is 
reproduced many times over while scaling up implies that the initial design is 
correct and that it is then just applied over a much larger area, generally at a lower 
cost. Replication at the geographical scale of the pilot sites in Bolivia20, India and 
Indonesia is probably possible, albeit limited by financial resources, human skills 
and the availability of appropriate sites. The options for scaling up these pilots sites 
into much larger projects is much less clear.
Within the timeframe of this final phase of the project, payment mechanisms were 
not developed at the other sites (in South Africa, the Caribbean, and Bhoj Wetlands 
and the Bhodi Suan catchment in India). However, the lessons learned from these 
experiences are important in contributing towards the project’s purpose, which is 
to increase understanding about the role of market mechanisms in promoting the 
provision of watershed services to improve livelihoods. 
In South Africa, a number of options for PWS mechanisms were identified on the 
upper Ga-Selati River, Limpopo Province (King et al., 2008). These included: a 
proposed partnership between commercial farmers and poor adjacent communities 
(under the ‘Working for Water’ programme) to clear alien invasive species in the 
Legalametse Nature Reserve. However, rapid changes in land ownership within the 
upper catchment and the pre-occupation of the remaining commercial farmers with 
processes of land restitution meant that very little progress was eventually made 
(King et al., 2008) This is an interesting variation on the assumption that secure 
land tenure is a precondition of the sellers of watershed services (Pagiola et al., 
2005; Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002).
Within the second South African site in the Sabie-Sand catchment, project activities 
did not progress beyond the baseline hydrological assessment. This was due to: 
the absence of a clear land-use–water problem; the absence of any demand by the 
downstream water users; the limited skills of the local partner; and competition 
between organisations within the catchment (King et al., 2008). As in the Ga-
Selati River catchment, land restitution and land claims were and remain the 
overwhelming priority of the downstream farmers who could have been potential 
buyers of watershed services. The experience from the two South African sites 
confirms the importance of the demand for watershed services – where there is no 
current demand, no PWS relationship is possible.
20. Since the project, Fundación Natura has started PWS schemes at two more sites and is scaling up at 
a third (M. T. Vargas, pers. comm.).
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Similarly, in the original Caribbean sites of Talvan (Saint Lucia) and Buff Bay (Jamaica) 
there were no clear willing buyers (McIntosh and Leotaud, 2007). During the project, 
it became apparent that there would have been greater potential from tourism 
enterprises located on or near the coast to become buyers of watershed services. 
However, even the sources of erosion causing the siltation of reefs are unclear and 
contested. Publicly, much of the blame for the erosion has been attributed to land-
use change, agriculture, and other activities in the watersheds. But there is also a 
sense that the construction of the hotels themselves, and the consequent disruption 
of fragile coastal ecosystems, could be as much to blame. Politically and financially, 
the tourism enterprises benefit from political patronage and/or subsidies, while 
tax payers firmly believe that government bears the responsibility for watershed 
management (Leotaud, 2006).
Recognising the importance of potential buyers of watershed services, the core 
team in the Bhoj Wetlands, India, developed a specific communications strategy 
to raise both public and corporate awareness of the value of the wetlands, which 
provide Bhopal City with much of its water. This included: seminars for private sector 
representatives and the media; the production and distribution of public relations 
material; street theatre performances; a painting competition; and a film, ‘Lake 
Matters’ (Saigal et al., 2005). The strategy was very successful in raising the profile, 
value, and challenges facing the Bhoj Wetlands. It has certainly initiated debate about 
the future of the wetlands, its role in providing water to Bhopal City, and the cost-
effectiveness of a proposed pipeline from the Narmada River (Agarwal et al., 2008). 
The Bhoj Wetlands face a number of significant and important challenges. These 
include: over-abstraction, contamination by solid and human waste, and pollution 
caused by inorganic fertilisers and other farming chemicals from the upper catchment. 
However, trials of the proposed solution, namely organic farming practices, showed 
very mixed results as many farmers reverted to inorganic compounds during the 
cropping cycle (Agarwal et al., 2008). As in the other sites where no payment 
mechanism was developed, the process adopted by the project has highlighted 
the technical, political and governance challenges to developing a PWS mechanism 
between the City of Bhopal and the residents of the upper catchment.
In summary: the project selected ten sites at which the core teams believed 
that there were good chances of developing nascent payment mechanisms for 
watershed services. Over three years the in-country teams worked with partners and 
stakeholders to develop payment mechanisms. In three of the sites, new payment 
mechanisms between upstream land users and downstream water users were 
developed. In Bolivia, the payments scheme on the Los Negros was strengthened 
through the work of the project. The site also provided a model and inspiration to the 
teams working at the other sites. The results from these four sites are important and 
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have provided important insights into PWS relationships. All four are effectively pilot 
sites in much larger catchments. The key lesson from the remaining six sites is that 
without strong demand for watershed services, little progress is possible. In at least 
one of the sites (Ga Selati, South Africa) there was a clear opportunity but, for the 
duration of the project at least, the potential buyers had other priorities.    
3.1.2 Direct and indirect impacts on livelihoods
Payments for watershed services made in the action-learning sites have, at best, 
supplemented livelihoods and created a diverse set of indirect benefits (Table 3). 
Experience in this project strongly suggests that we must dispense with any 
simplistic notion that large numbers of homogeneous poor upland land users can 
have their livelihoods quickly and easily improved by payments for watershed 
services. In the three sites where a PWS mechanism was developed, the gross  
value of the payments made was relatively small compared with the number of 
beneficiaries. At the Cidanau sites, for example, project partners concluded that, 
‘farmers find the payment level insufficient to make a meaningful contribution to 
their daily needs’ (Munawir and Vermeulen, 2007). Similarly, the analysis of the 
impact of the payments made in a fourth site, Los Negros, notes that ‘the direct 
impacts of the beehive transfers in Los Negros have been small and variable’ 
(Asquith and Vargas, 2007). In the inter-village example of Kuhan, the PWS 
agreement was made up of labour and money converted to saplings at the request 
of the upstream village (Agarwal et al., 2008).
There are several reasons for caution in considering PWS as a tool for poverty 
alleviation on any substantial scale. For a start, the administrative and technical 
capacity required to run a payments scheme is likely to take a long time and 
substantial resources to develop. In many countries, such as those in the project, 
PWS is a new approach to environmental management – the skills and experience 
to develop PWS approaches do not exist. Secondly, the simple dichotomy of the 
poor being upstream and the wealthy being downstream rarely holds true: it 
is sometimes reversed (for example in South Africa) and is usually much more 
complicated (FRP, 2005). Thirdly, there is little homogeneity amongst buyers and the 
sellers of watershed services. For example, while most recipients of payments in the 
project can be considered to be poor, they are nonetheless landholders or managers. 
The poorest sectors of society have little or no access to land – such landless people 
make up some 10-40 per cent of the adult population in the Brantas and Cidanau 
sites, for example (Munawir and Vermeulen, 2007). In short, the simple theoretical 
constructs that have characterised the PWS debate help us little when it comes to 
real watersheds – which are generally characterised by high degrees of economic, 
social and tenurial complexity.  
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Indirect benefits are diverse and significant. For example, all the Indonesian 
farmers’ groups involved in the schemes have invested in goat breeding, one side-
effect of which is planting hedges along terrace lines of dryland fields – providing 
both fodder and control of soil erosion. One farmers’ group invested revenue 
from the scheme in a successful fodder store while the Brantas farmers have also 
established tree nurseries necessary for the scheme to be viable small businesses. 
The Cidanau farmers’ groups have developed small enterprises in manufacture of 
vegetable crackers and vegetable oils (Munawir and Vermeulen, 2007). 
In the Kuhan site, indirect benefits from the agreement between the village 
development committees are largely in the form of increased biomass for use by 
upstream households, and expanded number of water users and irrigated area 
downstream (Agarwal et al., 2008). The beehives used in Los Negros have allowed 
farmers to diversify their livelihoods to include the production of honey for their 
own consumption and for sale. Several farmers have now had to hire additional 
labour to help them manage their hives or have entered into other arrangements 
with landless people (Asquith and Vargas, 2007; Robertson and Wunder, 2005).
In both the Brantas pilot sites and the Bolivian case the payments for watershed 
services have contributed to the empowerment of previously marginalised 
communities (Munawir and Vermeulen, 2007; Asquith and Vargas, 2007). In 
Brantas, the farmers’ group was able to negotiate better terms in their agreements 
with both the state-owned forestry company and the extension services. 
Although the direct payments are lower than the government’s own incentives 
for reforestation, farmers highlight the flexibility and self-determination that 
characterises their relationship with PJT1 and the NGO facilitator YPP (Munawir and 
Vermeulen, 2007). In Los Negros, it has been noted that ‘the indirect effects of the 
PES scheme have been larger and generally more positive’. The reasons given are:
l The formation of four functional environment committees.
l An association of beekeepers.
l Tensions between upstream and downstream communities are lower.
l There is general recognition that watershed management is everyone’s issue.
Source: Asquith and Vargas (2007).
Increasing confidence in the upstream communities of Los Negros is also evident 
in their recent assertions that they do not want financial assistance with honey 
production if such help is not tied to the programme’s goal of conditional 
development aid for watershed management and conservation. The farmers 
involved were concerned that donor-funded programmes that provide development 
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services without such conditionality or reciprocity would actually undermine the 
communities’ increasing sense of environmental responsibility (Asquith, personal 
communication).21
One of the most important findings from the project is the heightened sense of rights 
and responsibilities that seems to develop through PWS schemes. This is apparent in 
the ways in which local communities in the Indonesian, Indian and Bolivian case study 
sites have begun to engage with the process. There is a sense from the case studies in 
these three countries that the benefits derived through contracts have a higher value 
than those from government handouts because they are not obligated to the same 
extent (Munawir and Vermeulen, 2007). Thus experience begins to suggest that PWS 
can be empowering, with people moving from being passive recipients of development 
assistance to active participants in their own development through the agreements or 
contracts to which they are party. 
This sense of empowerment may extend to addressing inequities within the 
communities themselves. In the case of Los Negros, when those outside the local 
power elite engaged voluntarily in the project there was a backlash from the elite, 
who attempted to throw out the project from the upstream community. Following 
representations to the provincial government, the project was reinstated. The local 
municipality then went further and bought into the PWS scheme by contributing 
municipal funds. The acceptability and local legitimacy of the scheme subsequently 
increased and local power elites were less able to undermine it. Although in this 
case the municipality seems to command a higher level of respect than is the norm, 
the possibilities for spread and replication of the approach are nonetheless strong. 
In the case of Kuhan, investing in catchment protection upstream led to a rethink of 
membership criteria and water charges for the irrigation scheme. Development of 
multiple categories of membership and a revision of the water charges helped raise 
the water users from 8 to about 50. It is unlikely that this would have happened 
without the stimulus and empowerment provided by the negotiation process.
Indirect benefits may also be felt by the landless. Although they may have no formal 
land rights such individuals and user groups often have access rights that are locally 
and/or legally recognised. Spin-off benefits from payment mechanisms may create 
positive benefits for some people from amongst the poorest sections of a community. 
For example, poor people are now involved in increased non-timber forest products 
collection in arrangements struck with the forest service linked to farmers’ conservation 
of water springs at the Brantas site (Munawir and Vermeulen, 2007). In Los Negros, the 
PWS scheme has created a ‘secondary market’ for beehives through some farmers 
selling their hives to landless people in the valley; other farmers have hired landless 
labourers to help harvest and process the honey (Asquith and Vargas, 2008).
21. Nigel Asquith personal communication, November 2006, Cape Town, South Africa.
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Neutral or negative impacts from payment systems linked to land access can also 
be discerned. Within the Caribbean, several governments have developed fiscal 
instruments that resemble payments for watershed services. Because many of 
these are in the form of tax rebates for certain land-use practices, they are seldom 
applicable to the poorest sectors of society who are generally squatters with no land 
rights and off the radar screen of the tax authorities (McIntosh and Leotaud, 2007).
The activities within the action-learning sites and the diagnostic studies in Bolivia 
and China have shed little light on the question of the impact of PWS on poor 
households where they have to pay for watershed services. In the three action-
learning sites that developed financial transactions, there was no impact on poor 
water users. In Indonesia the payments come from a government-owned industrial 
conglomerate (KTI) and the management body of the Brantas catchment (PJT1). 
In Bolivia the beehives (and then more latterly the barbed wire) were purchased 
with money from a US donor with some contribution from the local municipality 
(Asquith et al., 2008). At Kuhan, where downstream farmers paid for the exclusion 
of livestock, there is no evidence to show that this had a negative impact on these 
buyers (Agarwal et al., 2008).
The diagnostic work in China provided insight into a national PWS programme 
and its impact on livelihoods. The Chinese government’s Sloping Lands Conversion 
Programme (SLCP) is, by any measure, the largest PWS scheme in the developing 
world (Bennett, 2008). Under the programme, the government pays farmers to 
stop cultivating on steep slopes. It is estimated that 53 million farmers are receiving 
compensation or payments to stop cultivating annual crops on ‘unsuitable’ land. 
At a macro-level the gross economic impact of the programme is impressive. For 
example, the stock of standing trees has increased by 38 per cent to 990 million m3; 
the annual value of timber produced is over US$2 billion (17.53 billion yuan); and an 
estimated 6 million homes are provided with fuel wood (Sun and Chen, 2006b).
An accurate assessment of the livelihood impacts of the SLCP is extremely 
complicated because of its sheer scale, the amount of money involved, and the 
variations across programmes and provinces. Sample surveys from three provinces 
in the Yellow and Yangtze river basins show that the gross payments exceed 
the median opportunity costs of cultivation forgone by the farmers.22 However, 
elsewhere there is evidence that farmers are not being sufficiently compensated 
for the short-term opportunity costs of giving up growing grain crops (Bennett, 
2008). For example in Gansu province almost 50% of surveyed households 
indicated that there was a decline of household income compared with before 
22. For example, in Sichuan Province the payment was US$417/ha/yr and the median opportunity 
cost estimated at US$358/ha/yr. In Shaanxi Province the payment was US$290/ha/yr and the median 
opportunity cost estimated at US$81/ha/yr (Xu and Cao, 2002).
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the implementation of the programme (Bennett, 2008). More worryingly, from an 
implementation perspective, there are systematic shortfalls in the benefits actually 
received by farmers for giving up cultivation due to deductions by institutions at 
higher levels (Bennett, 2008). 
Farmers are traditionally very conservative and the rates of adoption of new 
technology are generally very slow. Yet surveys have shown a high rate of uptake 
– some 70 per cent to 90 per cent in selected counties (Xu and Cao, 2002). These 
rates tend to support the survey data, which show that the payments in two 
provinces surveyed exceeded the average opportunity cost of the land-use changes. 
However, the SLCP is also known for the rent-seeking activities of bureaucrats at 
all levels, the competition and appropriation of resources by different departments, 
and various instances of coercion (Bennett, 2008; Sun and Chen, 2006b). It is 
interesting to note that during the project the Chinese government formally 
recognised the role of payments for land-use change as an important instrument in 
addressing the growing inequity between urban and rural areas (Li et al., 2007).
However, due to the sheer scale of the SLCP there are also indications that in 
some counties the combined package of coercion, cash and grain incentives has 
impoverished farmers, causing them to leave their lands (Sun and Chen, 2006b). 
This highlights the potential problems for poor people of programmes imposed as 
blueprints rather than negotiated as locally-workable agreements (Bennett, 2008).
In South Africa, no payment mechanisms were developed at the action-learning 
sites. However, in the context of local livelihoods the evolving policy situation is 
instructive. Since 1994 there has been a major national policy drive to address 
poverty and to right the wrongs of the apartheid years during which Africans were 
marginalised, manipulated and forcibly resettled into fragmented homelands. Given 
this history, a substantial redistribution of wealth, land and productive assets will 
be required to erase the inequalities that were created. In the context of payments 
for watershed services, it is explicitly acknowledged by some that the short-term 
political and economic imperatives for the redistribution of wealth will outweigh 
longer-term objectives such as sustainable land, water and natural resource 
management (Quibell and Stein, 2005). 
The Working for Water Programme (WfW), which is predominantly a government 
programme, has the twin objectives of watershed management and a poverty relief 
public works programme. Since the programme’s inception in 1995, almost 1 million 
hectares of alien vegetation have been cleared, with an imputed increase in 
streamflow of 46 million m3 per annum. Furthermore, the programme has provided 
employment to 24,000 previously unemployed persons (Turpie et al., 2008).
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In summary: our project’s results show that direct impacts on the livelihoods of 
farmers in the pilot sites from the nascent payment mechanisms are marginal. 
This suggests that PWS is not yet a tool for widespread and far-reaching poverty 
alleviation. The results also indicate that developing PWS relationships can lead to 
important indirect benefits such as improved social cohesion, self-determination and 
new entrepreneurial relationships. The analysis has also shown that poverty within 
a watershed is often a function of long legacies of injustice that only a large-scale 
reallocation of assets is likely to address (for example in South Africa and Indonesia).
3.1.3 Changes in land use
It is premature to venture any robust statements about the environmental impact 
of the payment mechanisms developed at the action-learning sites, since the 
schemes are in their early stages. The spatial scales of the land-use changes 
facilitated by the project are:
l Bolivia; Los Negros: maintenance of over 3,000 ha of forests.
l Indonesia; Brantas: replanting of 40 ha of critical land.
l Indonesia; Cidanau: replanting 50 ha of critical land.
l India; Kuhan: 12 ha of grazing land closed for rehabilitation through planting. 
Of the four sites where transactions occurred, the maintenance of over 3,000 ha 
of forest on the steep slopes of the Los Negros catchment stands out as a tangible 
achievement (Asquith and Vargas, 2007). However, it is difficult to give categorical 
answers to questions about the level of threat to these forests and the outcome if 
no payments had been made.
Some of the PWS literature and models tend to oversimplify land-use–watershed 
service relationships – the very basis upon which PWS schemes are built (Calder, 
2005). As with livelihood issues, simplistic notions of a core problem that can be 
rectified by a change in land use seldom do justice to the reality on the ground 
– which is characterised by competing interests and complex issues of scale. 
At many of the action-learning sites there appeared to be widespread consensus, 
albeit subjective, on the core problem and the changes in land use that were 
needed. However, further exploration of the hydrological relationships was often 
constrained by: the availability of skilled hydrologists; insufficient time-series data 
at the scale required; and, in one case, great reluctance by government officials 
to make public existing data on water quality. Consequently the land-use and 
hydrology reviews that have been carried out in the project countries and sites 
have generally been limited to reviewing existing data sets and are therefore 
constrained by the accuracy and length of these, as well as by the skills of the 
hydrologists involved (see, for example, Asquith and Vargas, 2007). The complexity 
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of the relationship between land use and both water quantity and quality is 
generally highlighted by these reviews. Causal quantified relationships between 
land use and indicators of water quality and/or quantity have been very difficult to 
establish – hydrologists are in short supply, calculations are demanding, and data 
collection and analysis is costly. 
Vested and competing interests are another problem. Two good examples from the 
Bhoj Wetlands action-learning site illustrate this. Firstly, the wetlands are subject 
to very high levels of solid, chemical and bacterial pollution from both urban and 
rural sources. Some of these sources are known (point source pollution) while 
others are more general and associated with land use (non-point source pollution). 
The multiple sources of pollutants means that it has not been possible to specify 
the precise links between farming systems adjacent to the lake and particular 
agricultural chemicals. In addition, information on water quality is aggregated and 
is only released publically at the discretion of the Lake Conservation Authority. 
Secondly, advocates of a plan to construct a pipeline from the Narmada River to 
supplement Bhopal City’s water are pushing ahead, despite preliminary calculations 
indicating that this could well be more costly that treating existing supply from the 
Bhoj Wetlands, because of the preference for large supply side engineering projects 
that can deliver large quantities of water upon completion (Agarwal et al., 2008).
Proponents of ecosystem services and incentives for watershed management 
seldom deal well with the challenges associated with scale. The challenges of scale 
in part explain why many of the hydrological surveys undertaken during the project 
were inconclusive. Measurable changes in the main water flow parameters, such as 
average peak and base flow resulting from land-use change, are largely confined 
to catchments of less than 100km2. At scales of more than 100 km2, changes in 
land-use practice are ‘either attenuated by intermediate processes (e.g. sediment 
deposition) or lost amidst the background noise caused by spatial and temporal 
variability in rainfall across the watershed as a whole’ (Frost, 2004). For the same 
reasons, changes in water quality as measured by sediment load and/or organic 
matter are not detectable above 100 km2. This means that at the scale of the 
Brantas River basin (12,000km2), only changes in salinity, pesticide levels or heavy 
metal content could be causally attributable to changes in land use.  
Of the project sites, the clearest land-use–water quantity relationships appear to be 
those of the upper Ga-Selati River, South Africa. It has been estimated that clearing 
the invasive alien species from the upper catchment would improve the flow in the 
river by about 1.67 million m3 per annum (Chapman, 2006). Further increases of 
280,000m3 per annum in streamflow would be possible if the efficiency of irrigation 
in a government irrigation and resettlement scheme were improved. These initial 
findings were very important for the next steps in the approach. Initially, the mining 
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complex at Phalaborwa had been identified as a potential buyer of additional water. 
However, the hydrological study revealed that despite the additional water, it would 
be unlikely to have significant effect on the flow in the Ga-Selati at Phalaborwa, 
principally because of the large number of dams and weirs constructed by farmers 
along the length of the river. These results led the project team to refocus on 
establishing a PWS mechanism between the Legalametse Nature Reserve and 
potential buyers in the upper catchment.
B
ox
 8
Hydrology and land use in the Ga-Selati River catchment
The Ga-Selati is a small river that rises in the Legalametse Nature Reserve (20,000 ha) in the 
Limpopo Province of South Africa. On average, river flow is 9 million m3/annum in the upper 
catchment and 43 million m3/annum in the middle and lower catchment. It is estimated that 
60 per cent of all the water abstracted from the upper river and its tributaries is wasted due 
to poor equipment and wasteful practices. Waters is also prevented from reaching the lower 
reaches by 40-plus illegal dams and weirs. 
Downstream water users, including irrigators, commercial wildlife producers and mining 
operations would benefit considerably from more water. Removal of the invasive alien 
species and the restoration of grassland in the upper catchment would save 1.67 million 
m3 of water annually. Unchecked growth and expansion of these invasive alien species will 
consume a further 3.8 million m3 of water annually. Removal of a low-yielding orchard and 
improvements to irrigation infrastructure would save a further 0.3 million and 7.1 million m3 
of water annually. 
Sources: Chapman (2006); King et al., (2008).
In Saint Lucia, the hydrological study considered land use – water quality issues 
within the relatively small Talvan catchment (about 3.2 km2). A participatory 
Talvan Water Catchment Group has been active in the area, aiming to get farmers 
to recognise their impacts on water quality and to work with them to make 
improvements. The group has benefited from some aid funding channelled through 
the Forestry Department. While survey evidence shows that public awareness on 
the issues has increased, there is little evidence to prove whether impacts on water 
quality are real. In effect, changes in land management have been paid for, with 
little certainty that the expected environmental service will result (Cox, 2004).
 
The two sites in Indonesia challenge the conventional wisdom that buyers of 
watershed services need tangible proof of the service that they are buying. 
Hydrological surveys were not required to stimulate payments from PJT1 and KTI for 
tree planting at the pilot sites (in the Brantas and Cidanau catchments respectively). 
Munawir and Vermeulen (2007) suggest that this is because: i) culturally, trees 
are seen as the natural vegetation of Java; ii) administratively, conservation is the 
mandate of the Forest Department; iii) practically, tree planting is easy and does not 
require external technical assistance; and iv) politically, farmers often have little say 
in what happens to the land that they use. 
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In the three Indian sites, data and the perception on hydrological processes played an 
important role in the different outcomes. In the Bhoj Wetlands, the aggregated water 
quality data meant that the relative impact of the different sources of pollutions could 
only be broadly estimated. In Kuhan, the joint transects through the catchment, the 
development of erosion potential maps and the presence of a local hydrologist played an 
important role in building confidence and getting agreement on the area that was closed 
to grazing. At Bhodi-Suan, the rapid hydrological survey failed to convince communities 
that upstream closure could increase water flows. This decision was strongly influenced 
by a previous closure, a decade ago, that failed to increased water flow.
In summary: the land-use changes and the permanence of the PWS schemes stimulated 
in the course of this project look positive, but judgement is premature. The hydrological 
effects of particular land-use actions are often in practice hard to pin down due to 
inadequate or inaccessible information and complications of geographical scale. In this 
context it is unsurprising that perceptions about watershed service provision are at best 
only one of many factors involved in decisions about upland land use. Interrogation of 
these perceptions may be the key additional function that PWS schemes look to provide.
3.2 Findings from the international case study review
The 2002 review of payments for ecosystem services by IIED focused on the evolution 
and structure of markets for ecosystem services and their impacts on human welfare 
(Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). The review highlighted that:
l The evolution and structure of markets for ecosystem services was poorly 
understood.
l There was little evidence of the impact, either positive or negative, that payments 
and markets were having on poor households.
l Payments for watershed services were more likely to be developed through 
negotiation between stakeholders than by the emergence of a market characterised 
by competition, supply and demand.
l There was a growing willingness to pay for changes in land use because of a greater 
understanding of land-use–water relationships and the growing threats to the supply 
of watershed services. 
In updating this review a sample of some 123 payments for watershed services 
initiatives or ‘PWS case studies’ in developing countries were identified by IIED  
(Porras et al., 2008). Of these 123 cases examined, 73 were excluded from the 
statistics because they were either borderline in terms of the PWS definition or there 
was insufficient information in the public domain to include them in the final analysis. 
The review also identified a further eight ‘advanced proposals’ and 37 ‘preliminary 
proposals’ for PWS schemes.
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Surveys (or reviews like this) that are based on secondary sources face several 
methodological challenges. The first is in trying to understand the sample and the 
extent to which the final set of cases ‘represents’ the real world. The second is 
that there are issues of scale, especially in the presentation of statistics. Both the 
2002 and the current reviews analyse and generate simple descriptive statistics 
based on the ‘number of initiatives’ as the primary metric. This means that the 
Chinese government’s Sloping Lands Conversion Programme (SLCP), which deals 
with 53 million farmers over 17.34 million ha and has cost US$7.6 billion (Sun and 
Chenb, 2006), has the same weight as the Los Negros Project in Bolivia, with 34 
farmers, 3,000 hectares and a total cost of US$23,000 (Asquith and Vargas, 2007). 
A third challenge is that of confirmation bias: project managers, not external and 
independent analysts, produced much of the information that was used to compile 
the case studies (Porras et al., 2008).
What has happened since 2002? Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold? identified a growing 
willingness by the beneficiaries of watershed services to pay for watershed 
protection (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). Revisiting 42 of the developing country 
initiatives identified and analysed in 2002 shows that there are still substantial 
hurdles to overcome in implementing the concept. For example, 9 out of 17 the 
initiatives classified as ‘proposals’ in 2002 have ‘failed’ or are of ‘uncertain status’ 
(Table 4). Of the remaining eight, four are still ‘ongoing’ while a further three 
remain as ‘proposals’. One proposal has been reclassified as a borderline case. 
Similarly, of the 25 proposals considered to be ‘ongoing’ in 2002, 11 have been 
‘abandoned’ or are of ‘uncertain status’. Therefore, from the overall sample of 42 
initiatives only 18 (15 ongoing plus 3 proposals – 44 per cent) can be considered to 
still be ‘active’, implying that 21 (51 per cent) of the initiatives reviewed in 2002 
have been abandoned or are of uncertain status. A further three (5 per cent) have 
been reclassified.23
Precise reasons for these failures are difficult to ascertain (because failures are 
seldom written up), but they include: an absence of political support; limited 
demand for watershed services; political upheavals; other priorities; and a sense 
that the proposed mechanisms were too complex to be implemented (Porras et 
al., 2008). However, it should be noted that the terms ‘abandoned’, ‘failed’ and 
‘uncertain status’ have been used with care – the figures on these initiatives paint a 
picture of PWS schemes in developing countries generally being in the early stages 
of evolution and often lacking the necessary robust and cohesive institutions and 
skilled people.  
23. Comparable figures with other similarly complex environment and development projects are hard 
to find. A review of forest enterprises from east and southern Africa showed that that closure rates 
exceeded 10% per year and that 50% of businesses closed by the end of their third year of operation 
(Arnold et al., 1994).
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Initiatives Number in 2002 Number and current status of initiatives
Proposals 17 l 10 failed or uncertain status 
l 3 are ongoing 
l 3 are still proposals 
l 1 reclassified as a borderline case
Ongoing1 25 l 11 abandoned or uncertain status 
l 12 are ongoing 
l 0 proposals 
l 2 reclassified as borderline PWS cases
Total 42 l 21 abandoned or uncertain 
l 15 ongoing  
l 3 proposals 
l 3 reclassified as borderline PWS cases
Current status of 42 of the PWS initiatives identified and used as case 
studies in 2002
1. Ongoing’ refers to mature and pilot cases 
Source: Porras et al. (2008).
3.2.1 Payments and payment mechanisms
Exploring the fate of the 2002 sample of initiatives highlights the challenges in 
developing payments for watershed services. But the main objective of the current 
survey was to provide a reference point against which to triangulate the experiences 
and lessons from IIED’s partners and their action-learning sites. The analysis of the 
selected cases provides a perspective from across developing countries on issues such 
as the geographical spread and evolution of PWS mechanisms, the types of payments 
being made, how payments are being made, and their impacts on livelihoods and 
their environmental impacts.
Where are PWS mechanisms being developed? The sample of initiatives and schemes 
that met the selection criteria and for which there was sufficient available information 
shows a strong regional bias. Approximately 70 per cent of the sample are from 
Central America, the Caribbean and South America with the balance being 28 per cent 
from Asia and 2 per cent from Africa (Figure 3). This differs from the geographical 
analysis of the previous sample where the cases in developing countries were divided 
as follows: 52 per cent from Central America, the Caribbean and South America; 37 per 
cent Asia; and 11 per cent Africa24 (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). 
Common to both surveys is the low number of schemes and initiatives in Africa. 
The regional differences in the uptake of PWS has led Porras et al. (2008) to 
broadly characterise the Caribbean, South and Central America as a region that is 
‘implementing PWS’, Asia as a region that is ‘experimenting with and preparing for 
PWS’ and Africa as a region where very little progress is being made with PWS. 
24. A further 24 cases from developed countries were included in the 2002 Landell-Mills and Porras sample.
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Source: Porras et al. (2008).
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Are local-level initiatives increasing? In 2002, 68 per cent of the initiatives 
reviewed were at the level of the watershed or basin (Landell-Mills and Porras, 
2002), the balance (32 per cent) being initiatives at national level. In the current 
sample, some 82 per cent (41) of initiatives are defined as local while 18 per cent 
(9) are national programmes (Table 5). The small sample sizes in both surveys 
prevent rash inferences about changes in the number of national-level initiatives 
relative to the number of local-level schemes. However, the differences and the 
distinction between the two approaches to PWS are important, particularly in 
terms of the source of funding since one of the main reasons for interest in PWS 
schemes is for their leverage of new funding sources. Payments under national-
level PWS initiatives are primarily made from government revenue and therefore 
do not technically constitute ‘new sources of funding’ (Wunder, 2005). Local-level 
initiatives tend to have a higher proportion of private sector finance but are often 
co-financed by government. Interestingly, the survey noted that there were at least 
four donor-led, international programmes that aim to facilitate the development of 
PWS schemes in multiple sites across several countries.
What services are being provided? Watershed services are generally disaggregated 
into three functions: the quantity of water, the quality of water, and the regulation 
of flow (Calder, 2005; Bruijnzeel, 2004; van Noordwijk et al., 2004). The analysis of 
the watershed service being provided by each scheme in the sample is complicated 
by two issues. Firstly, in some schemes both water quantity and water quality are 
stated objectives. Secondly, services are also bundled together with other ecosystem 
services. The results should therefore be broadly interpreted.
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From amongst the local initiatives, and albeit marginally, water quality is the 
primary service sought by buyers. At the national level, initiatives appear to be 
less focused on realising a specific watershed service. Governments are generally 
setting broad watershed conservation goals for these programmes – these include 
water quality and quantity regulation as well as other broader conservation and 
poverty alleviation objectives (Figure 4). However, within the sample of local 
initiatives there are also indications of multiple objectives, although possibly not to 
quite the same extent. 
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Category of initiative
Sample 
size Examples
National initiatives 9 l Sloping Lands Conversion Programme (SLCP), China 
l Working for Water (WfW), South Africa 
l Payments for Environmental Services (PSA), Costa Rica 
l Payments for hydrological environmental services 
(PSAH), Mexico
Local/catchment 
initiatives
41 l Los Negros and Tarija, Bolivia 
l Kuhan, India 
l Mangla Dam, Pakistan 
l Mt. Kanla-on, Philippines 
l Cacau Valley Brazil 
Total 50
Examples of local-level initiatives and national-level schemes in the sample 
Source: Porras et al. (2008).
(*) ‘Bundled’ refers to where one or more environmental service is provided simultaneously (Landell-Mills and 
Porras, 2002). (**) Initiatives may primarily seek more than one service. 
Source: Porras et al. (2008).
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What are the principal drivers of PWS initiatives? In 2002, 52 per cent of the 
initiatives were demand-led, principally by the belief that ‘forests play a critical 
role in maintaining water quality and quantity’ (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). 
Significantly only 8 per cent of the initiatives were considered to have been initiated 
by suppliers of watershed services. The current review faced substantial challenges 
in identifying single stakeholders as drivers of PWS initiatives. The development 
of PWS mechanisms generally evolves over time in response to problems that are 
being felt by both water users and upstream land managers. Over the last few years 
there appears to have been an upsurge in the number of programmes and projects 
that are being facilitated by stakeholders – such as development and conservation 
organisations – that are not resident within the catchment.  
What type of land managers are supplying watershed services? The analysis 
of the current sample of case studies shows that private land-holders are the 
primary suppliers of watershed services to both local initiatives and national 
programmes (Figure 5). One inference that can be drawn is that, in contrast to 
the difficulty of working with large numbers of people within communally-owned 
lands, private landholders may more easily secure the necessary control over their 
land and the incentives to engage with a PWS mechanism and to comply with the 
contingency requirements (Porras et al., 2008). The only substantive example of 
communal landowners benefiting from PWS is the PSAH Programme of the Mexican 
government. Under the programme, payments are made to the ‘Ejido Assembly’ on 
behalf of its members. This option was chosen because there was more legal support 
for the Ejido25 being the forest owner. The challenges associated with common 
ownership of land may explain why so few PWS schemes have been developed 
in Africa, where land is generally communally owned but under overlapping and 
sometimes contradictory mix of traditional and modern policy and legislation.
The other categories of tenure included in Figure 5 reflect the small sample size and 
the diversity and complexity of classifying land tenure. As in the other analyses, the 
data are complicated by some of the initiatives in the sample being implemented in 
situations with multiple land tenure systems (Porras et al. 2008).
Who is paying for watershed services? Advocates of PES argue that when 
operational they are a more reliable and regular source of ‘conservation’ funding 
than typically provided by governments under more traditional funding mechanisms 
(Engel et al., 2008; Wunder, 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005). The examination of the case 
studies shows that funding to PWS schemes is seldom from a single source – many 
of both the local and national initiatives have multiple sources of funding. Support 
25. An Ejido refers to land that is communally managed by formerly landless people in Mexico. It was 
introduced through changes in the Mexican Constitution in 1917 and operationalised in 1934. The members 
of the Ejido have user rights rather than ownership over the land (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ejido).
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* A few initiatives deal with more than one tenure system
Source: Porras et al. (2008).
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for PWS programmes can also take two forms, the first being actual payments for 
watershed services, the second being general support for establishing or facilitating 
the development of the payments scheme. From the small sample and limited 
detail available, however, it is often difficult to differentiate the two types of 
financial support. 
There are generally two sources of funding for the national-level programmes – the 
government itself, and donors (Figure 6). Government funding comes from general 
revenue in all cases except in Costa Rica where the bulk of the revenue is derived 
from a 3.5 per cent tax on fuel that the government has committed to using to pay 
for watershed management26 (Pagiola, 2008; Porras et al., 2008). 
The situation amongst the local initiatives is much more complex and is characterised 
by multiple sources of funds. The evidence suggests that private sector funds are 
limited and certainly have not developed as expected. Where private sector funds 
are in place, these appear to be corporate social responsibility-type payments, rather 
than market-based payments for watershed services (Porras et al., 2008).
The Silver Bullet analysis identified some 13 different types of commodities that 
can be used to ‘market’ watershed services (in both developing and developed 
26. Additional funding for the Costa Rican programme has also come from the World Bank and the 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF) (Pagiola et al., 2008).
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countries). These range from simple contracts between upstream and downstream 
farmers to sophisticated ‘secondary instruments’ such as ‘salmon safe products’27 
(Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). While the current review (in developing countries) 
found a complex mixture of funding sources, these were primarily different sources 
of finance for relatively simple forms of PWS contracts between upstream farmers 
and downstream water users.
Funding from international and bilateral donors fulfils many roles in both local 
initiatives and national programmes. Funding, sometimes with technical support from 
international organisations, is used for example to support transaction costs such as 
undertaking feasibility studies and building capacity. Some support is considered to 
be transitional until government and/or private sector funds are in place.
27. These are arrangements where the farmers who invest in land management practices that are 
sensitive to the water quality needs of salmon are rewarded with premiums in the market (Landell-Mills 
and Porras, 2002).
* Initiatives may have several sources of funding
Source: Porras et al. (2008).
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How are payment levels decided? The 2002 analysis noted that payments for 
watershed services were most likely to arise out of negotiation between the 
stakeholders rather than be driven by market forces. However, the authors did 
predict the eventual emergence of ‘supply driven markets’ with increasingly 
sophisticated commodities and payment mechanisms (Landell-Mills and Porras, 
2002). Yet there is little evidence within the current sample to suggest that markets 
are leading to the creation of PWS initiatives in developing countries.  
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In the absence of competitive markets with many buyers of watershed service, the 
levels of payment are either determined through negotiation between stakeholders 
or are set administratively (Table 6). Overwhelmingly, payments under the national 
programmes are predominantly set administratively. The one exception is the 
Ecoservicios Scheme in El Salvador, where there have been negotiations between 
government and the farmers – however, it should be noted that this is in the 
context of a pilot scheme (Porras et al., 2008). In general, national programmes 
are being implemented at large geographical scales – standardisation is both a 
means to reduce the transaction costs but also a reflection of the multiple objectives 
of these national programmes. Within the sample of local initiatives, marginally 
more are characterised by negotiation (20) over the levels of payment than by an 
administrative process (or no negotiation) (18) (Table 6). Again the emphasis from 
the sample appears to be on simple arrangements as there are no examples of 
more sophisticated instruments for price determination such as trading and auctions, 
as was found in the 2002 survey (during which there was a general sense that more 
sophisticated instruments would soon be more common). 
Technically, economic valuation techniques can provide an estimate of the value 
of the services and can be used as a guideline for either further negotiation 
or administrative pricing. However, because valuation techniques are complex 
procedures and frequently challenged, facilitators often revert to estimating the 
direct and opportunity costs of the changes in land use that the landowner or 
manager will bear in order to provide the service (Porras et al., 2008). It has been 
noted that while simplicity maybe appealing from an implementer’s perspective, 
Ferraro (2008) notes that the asymmetrical distribution of information between land 
managers and buyers of environmental services may lead to inefficient outcomes 
in emerging PES programmes. This contradicts the underlying premise that PES 
mechanisms are more efficient that other conservation tools (Ferraro, 2008).
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Source: Porras et al. (2008).
Method of price setting Local initiatives 
(sample size = 38)
National programmes 
(sample size = 9)
Administrative 18 8
Negotiation
l Direct between buyer and seller 3 0
l Through NGO as intermediary 13 0
l Through government as intermediary 4 1
Other, including trading systems and auctions 0 0
Totals 38 9
Distribution of negotiated and administratively set prices in local initiatives 
and national programmes  
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What kinds of payments are being made, and how often? The evidence from the 
cases is that the type of payments (cash, in-kind, etc.) and their frequency vary 
considerably between schemes. Theoretically, payments to farmers need to be 
regular otherwise there will be a strong incentive to return to previous land uses 
(Wunder, 2005). Thus it has been noted that ‘if the externality underlying PES is 
permanent, as for instance will apply to most cases of forest conservation, there 
is no reason to believe that a service will be provided after the payments end’ 
(Wunder et al., 2008). 
There is also some debate about the use of cash payments directly to farmers 
– this is an issue that has been raised before in the conservation and development 
discourse (Hulme and Murphree, 2001; Child, 2004). It is argued that cash payments 
may not be effective – they may be captured only by men, and/or cause social 
distress and myopic spending. Conversely, there are strong arguments that suggest 
that development is best achieved through the provision of truly discretionary 
funding to poor people, which means making payments in cash and allowing the 
beneficiaries decide how to spend the money (World Bank, 2002). 
The evidence from the cases reviewed shows that about 50 per cent of local 
initiatives make regular cash payments to farmers and land managers. For national-
level programmes, regular cash payments are more frequent than in-kind payments 
(Table 7). Interestingly, the majority of these examples are in Central America 
(Costa Rica and Ecuador) although other examples are found in Indonesia and 
India. Cash payments do have many advantages. These include: making a tangible 
link between buyer and suppliers; reinforcing the idea of compliance; and being 
relatively easy to manage. Generally, where regular cash payments are being 
made, these are simple flat rates per unit area. The only example of differentiated 
cash payments in a national programme is in Mexico, where the government pays 
a higher rate for the conservation of cloud forest than it does for forest at lower 
altitudes (Munôz-Pina et al., 2008).
Outside Central America, the review found various types of in-kind payments being 
used. Examples include: seedlings for reforestation (Brazil, Ecuador, the Philippines); 
technical advice (the Philippines, Honduras and Ecuador); and improved land tenure 
(Indonesia). Non-financial transfers are often useful when there is cultural resistance 
to the commoditisation of natural resources, or the suppliers of watershed services 
are more interested in the non-financial benefits.
The review also shows that from within the sample of local initiatives, most of the 
payments (+/- 75 per cent) were made to the farmers through an intermediary 
organisation. For example, the Costa Rican power utility, CNFL, which operates 
several hydro-electric power stations, sub-contracts PWS functions to FONAFIFO 
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Source: Porras et al. (2008).
Type of payments Local initiatives  
(sample size = 38)28
National programmes 
(sample size = 8)29
In-kind and one-off 12 3
In-kind and periodic 1 1
Cash and one-off 3 1
Cash and periodic 20 6
Totals 36 11
Type and frequency of payments made 
28. Excludes Lake Toba and San Jeronimo (no payments to landholders) and Morazan (no information). 
29. Excludes the WfW programme in South Africa
– the organisation that also deals with the government payments. In about 25 per 
cent of the cases examined, payments were made directly to farmers by the buyers 
of watershed services. Again in Costa Rica, the water utility Empresa de Servicios 
Publicos de Heredia (ESPH – Public Utilities Company of Heredia) both collects 
water fees from users and makes payments to land managers in catchment areas. 
However, the cases of direct transfers usually involve relatively few land managers 
and a single downstream buyer. 
The data indicate that intermediary organisations have a significant influence on 
PWS mechanisms. They are often involved in all stages of the development of the 
PWS mechanism and may have further roles in the disbursement of payments. 
The integrity, neutrality and accountability of these organisations to both the 
buyers and sellers of watershed services may well determine the long-term 
viability of PWS schemes. Intermediary organisations are also becoming the gate-
keepers of environmental trust funds that are being used to make payments 
(Porras et al., 2008).
What are the changes that are being paid for? Under both the national 
programmes and local initiatives, payments are being made to farmers and land 
managers to change their activities in order to achieve certain objectives in terms 
of water quality and quantity. From the analysis of the cases, four broad categories 
of land-use change (or in one case ‘no change’) have been identified. These are 
(Porras et al., 2008): 
1. Restoration: activities that lead to the recovery or rehabilitation of degraded 
ecosystems that will produce an environmental service.
2. Conservation: conservation of existing land cover and ecosystems (no change).
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3. Reforestation: largely of commercial plantations.
4. Improved land management: a range of improved land management activities 
primarily in areas of settlement and cultivation.
Within the small sample of national-level programmes, each of the four categories is 
almost equally represented in the sample (Table 8). Within the local initiatives, the 
improvement of land management practices (27 cases) within existing agro-pastoral 
systems and the conservation of existing indigenous land cover (23 cases) are the 
primary changes that are being sought by PWS mechanisms. As expected, the actual 
land-use changes within the category of ‘improved land management’ are diverse 
and reflect the context and the sites involved. However, the changes that are being 
made include: soil and water conservation techniques; alternatives to shifting 
agriculture; switching from inorganic to organic farming systems; the introduction 
of shade coffee (PSA in Costa Rica and Jesus de Otora in Honduras); and improved 
ranch management (Silvopastoral programme, Costa Rica, Columbia and Nicaragua).
Ta
bl
e 
8
(1) Initiatives and programmes may seek more than one change in land use
Source: Porras et al. (2008).
Changes in land use Local initiatives  
(sample size = 39)
National programmes 
(sample size = 9)
1.  Restoration of degraded systems 3 4
2.  Conservation of existing systems 23 3
3.  Reforestation of commercial 
plantations
11 5
4.  Improved land management 27 4
Totals 64(1) 16(1)
Land use changes being made by farmers and land managers 
From the total sample, there are 26 cases in which payments are being used 
to conserve existing ecosystems. Costa Rica and Mexico provide two important 
examples: in Costa Rica, over 80 per cent of the PES payments are for the 
conservation of existing forest; in Mexico, the government’s programme (PSAH) 
is directed at forest conservation in areas that are considered important to 
groundwater recharge. Within Costa Rica, there are also several initiatives that 
are focusing on the conservation of existing ecosystems such as CNFL – Compañía 
Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, a private company (but majority-owned by the state 
utility company, Costa Rican Institute of Electricity, ICE).
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In summary: this review of 50 payments for watershed service schemes has shown 
us that PWS, as a tool, is still in its infancy. PWS schemes do fail, or to put it another 
way the failure of PWS schemes to develop and become self financing is significant. 
Where they are being developed, PWS are being used to address problems with 
the quality of water and the quantity of water through a variety of changes in land 
use – restoration, conservation, reforestation and improved land management. It is, 
however, clear that fully developed markets for watershed services are a long way 
off, particularly in developing countries. 
3.2.2 Livelihood impacts of payments for watershed services
Regarding the impact of PWS on the livelihoods of poor people, the 2002 review 
concluded that: ‘the superficial nature of impact analysis extends to evaluations of 
costs and benefits to poor households. For the most part, little or nothing is said on 
the topic’ (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). The authors argued that the asymmetrical 
access to information and to skills, which penalise the suppliers of services, are 
the two major constraints limiting the benefits to poor people from payments for 
watershed services. However, it is also important to recognise that for at least some 
PES schemes, poverty alleviation is not an objective and therefore cannot fairly be 
deemed to be a measure of performance (Wunder et al., 2008).
In addition to collecting secondary information on the evolution, development and 
structure of PWS schemes, the current review offers some opportunity to assess the 
impacts of the case studies on livelihoods and poverty. Generally, the analysis of the 
impact of PWS schemes on livelihoods is constrained by time-limited data sets. This 
is because PWS is a recent innovation and the schemes lack extended and critical 
time-series analyses on their impact. Frequently, where ex-poste studies have 
been carried out they tend to focus on the suppliers of services rather than all the 
stakeholders, thus limiting the opportunities for exploring the wider indirect benefits 
and impacts of PWS (Pagiola et al., 2005). Again, the potential for confirmation bias 
needs to be recognised because most of the material is in the form of case studies, 
written either by PWS advocates or facilitators of PWS schemes (Porras et al., 2008). 
What are the impacts on the suppliers of watershed services? The evidence 
from this review shows that private landholders are the primary, but not the only, 
beneficiaries of both the local initiatives and national programmes (see Figure 7). In 
most cases the beneficiaries of PWS schemes are people who legally own land or 
have de facto rights over land. Therefore, where poverty and the lack of access to 
land or land ownership are closely related, PWS initiatives will not address the needs 
of the poorest people in society (Grieg-Gran, and Bishop, 2004).
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Notwithstanding the close relationship between access to land and poverty, many 
schemes do provide positive benefits to relatively poor rural households (Table 9). 
Good examples of people benefiting are to be found in the local schemes in Honduras 
(Jesus de Otoro) and El Salvador (Yamabal, Tacuba and Chalatenango). It is clear 
that some initiatives also benefit farmers whose incomes are generally higher than 
national averages. For example, the average income of the 13 farmers in the Los 
Negros scheme in Bolivia is about US$1,000 (in 2004), which is much higher than 
other parts of Bolivia (Robertson and Wunder, 2005; Asquith et al., 2008).
The experience with national-level schemes is also mixed. This is exemplified by the 
comparison of the Mexican and the Costa Rican programmes. Under the national 
PWS scheme in Mexico (PSAH), 78 per cent of payments have been made to people 
who live in population centres that are either highly or very highly marginalised 
from mainstream economic development (Munôz-Pina et al., 2008). In contrast, 
it is estimated that most of the payments made under Costa Rica’s national PWS 
scheme benefited people with title to land, as it was illegal to use public money 
to make payments to people without title deeds. Recently, however, FONAFIFO 
has used private funds with similar or parallel contracts to allow land managers 
without formal title deeds to participate in the national programme. This provides 
an opportunity for the programme to reach a poorer sub-set of people who, for one 
reason or another, have not been able to secure title to their land (Pagiola, 2008). 
These changes will also improve the overall efficacy of the programme by allowing 
greater geographical coverage in important watershed areas.
What are the impacts on the livelihoods of people who are landless? Typically, 
analysis of the impact of PWS schemes has focused on those who are receiving the 
payments and not on landless people who may also live within the same community. 
The distribution and ownership of land is therefore critical to the potential poverty 
impact that a PWS scheme may have (Pagiola et al, 2005). There are mechanisms by 
which landless people can participate in PWS schemes. For example in Sukhomajri, 
India, landless people were assigned water rights that allowed them to participate in 
a PWS scheme – but this was in an unusually homogenous community and has been 
hard to replicate even within India (Kerr, 2002). 
Working for Water (WfW) in South Africa specifically targets people who are landless 
and unemployed – providing them with work clearing invasive alien species whose 
spread, particularly in montane grasslands, is causing a reduction in streamflow. The 
programme has provided work for 24,000 unemployed or under-employed people 
annually, the majority of whom are women (Milton et al., 2003, quoted in Turpie et 
al., 2008). This means that the programme has been funded by government poverty 
alleviation funds rather than from conservation budgets (Turpie et al., 2008).
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What are the impacts on those who are paying for watershed services? While the 
review found that 15 local initiatives and one national programme had resulted in 
increased water user fees, there are only five examples where the impacts have been 
analysed (Porras et al., 2008). In these cases, there has been very little financial impact 
on water users. It is reported that for three schemes the increase in user fees amounted 
to between 0.01 per cent and 0.04 per cent of total income (Kosoy et al., 2005 a and 
b, quoted in Porras et al., 2008). This is because the charges are set very low compared 
with the rates that the water users are willing to pay. For example, in Costa Rica, the 
willingness to pay for watershed services was estimated to be three times higher than 
the actual environmental charge added to the bill.
In Nicaragua, safety nets have been developed to protect the poorest consumers from 
the adverse impacts of the increases in water fees. The safety net provides free water for 
the poorest, and in another example creates opportunities for poor people to contribute 
labour instead of making cash payments (Pérez, 2005, quoted in Porras et al., 2008). 
In summary: there were real and legitimate concerns that the rapid development of 
markets and payments for ecosystem services could have a detrimental impact on 
poor people. This review has shown that the primary beneficiaries of PWS schemes are 
farmers with land for whom the benefits have, in general, been modest. The poorest 
are often also landless and therefore do not benefit to the same extent. There are 
innovative programmes, such as WfW in South Africa, that have found ways to ensure 
that the poor and landless do benefit, largely through employment. 
3.2.3 What are the environmental impacts of payments for watershed services?
The review of case studies highlights an interesting paradox – while the main stated 
objective of the national programmes and local initiatives is addressing environmental 
problems, there is little or no robust assessment of the environmental impacts of these 
programmes. One reason for the paucity of data seems to be the methodological 
problems involved in trying to quantify the environmental impact of PWS initiatives.
Land-use and water relationships are complex, non-linear, and highly variable, both 
spatially and over time. The understanding of the relationship between the land – and 
in particular land cover – and water is often shaped by deeply entrenched myths 
(Calder, 2005; Bruijnzeel 2004). To assess the impacts of PWS and land-use change on 
water quality and water quantity, long and accurate data sets are necessary. Too often 
these are unavailable in developing countries, or if they are available the data sets are 
often too coarse to be of much use at the sub-catchment level (Porras et al., 2008). 
Porras et al. note: ‘During this review it was difficult, and many times impossible, to 
find strong scientific evidence of the impacts. There are few examples, if any, of PWS 
schemes that consistently measure and monitor the delivery of watershed services.’ 
However, there is a general increase in the understanding of the relationships between 
Fair deals for watershed services 63
Ta
bl
e 
9
Source: Porras et al. (2008).
Category Country Study Scheme Finding
National
Mexico González 
(2005)
PSAH 73% of small private land-holders, and 
80% of ejidos members, reported that 
PWS payments were important for 
their annual income
Costa Rica Ortiz M. et al. 
(2003)
National level 9% of sample reported that PWS 
represented more than 10% of their 
income; 
67% of sample reported that PWS 
payments represented less than 10% 
of their income; 
13% reported PWS payments had no 
effect on their income
Costa Rica Miranda et al. 
(2003)
Virilla 
watershed
On average, PWS payments 
represented 16% of annual household 
income 
Costa Rica Kosoy et al. 
(2005b)
ESPH Scheme, 
Heredia
60% respondents reported PWS 
payments represented less than 2% of 
gross income; 
30% of respondents reported PWS 
payments represented less than 10% 
of gross income; 
10% of respondents reported PWS 
payments represented 22% of gross 
income (n=10)
Local
Ecuador Echavarría et 
al. (2004)
Pimampiro Annual PWS payment constitutes 30% 
of household income 
Honduras Kosoy et al. 
(2005b)
Jesus de Otoro 3 (out of 4) respondents reported that 
PWS payments represented less than 
1.5% of gross household income
Nicaragua Corbera et al. 
(2006)
San Pedro del 
Norte
Payments are less than 10% of annual 
income
Examples of financial benefits to households 
land use and water at both the national and the international levels (see Box 10). 
The extent to which future PWS schemes engage with this evidence will be critical 
to their performance. 
In general there is a sense from amongst the cases reviewed that water flows 
are improving as a result of PWS. However, for the reasons noted above, there is 
very little evidence to support these statements and they should be considered as 
assertions only. Where evidence is produced as ‘proof’, the scale and the timeframe 
generally cast doubt on the veracity of the claim (Kosoy et al., 2005a).
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Problems of ‘additionality’ and ‘leakage’
‘Additionality’ and ‘leakage’ are two key problems for PWS.30 The challenge of ‘additionality’ 
arises from the absence of a control, or the full understanding of what would have happened 
in the absence of the changes wrought by the PWS scheme. Consequently, the ‘without 
PWS’ situation is often extrapolated from other sites or historical data sets (Wunder, 2005). 
Examples of additionality problems include: 
l In Mexico, only 11 per cent of the land under contract in the PSAH scheme in 2003 was 
considered to be at ‘high’ or ‘very high risk of deforestation’. This figure did increase to 
28 per cent in 2004. Nevertheless, the implication is that almost three quarters of the 
payments are unnecessary if their objective is to prevent deforestation (objectives may 
include other means to improve watershed services). 
l In Bolivia, the Los Negros farmers nominate what areas of their land are to be set 
aside. As payments only cover 2 per cent to 10 per cent of the opportunity cost, farmers 
nominate steep land that is unlikely to be converted.
l In Costa Rica, the PSA programme operates on a ‘first come first served’ basis, which 
makes little connection with hydrological priorities.
The problem of ‘leakage’ occurs when land users and managers agree to a set of land-use 
changes, but then displace or go elsewhere with their ‘undesirable’ practices. For example, 
when a community of farmers agree a land-use plan within a given area but then go outside 
of the planned area and clear more land for cultivation – this would be considered leakage.
Source: Porras et al. (2008).
30. ‘Additionality’ and ‘leakage’ are terms that have developed around the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol. In that context they are defined as follows: Additionality 
is when there is a positive difference between the emissions that occur in the baseline scenario and 
the emissions associated with a proposed project. Leakage is the indirect effect of emission reduction 
policies or activities that lead to a rise in emissions elsewhere (e.g. fossil fuel substitution leads to a 
decline in fuel prices and a rise in fuel use elsewhere). Source: http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/
sectors/ccpo/glossary/page20687.html
Evidence of improved water quality as the desired service is equally sketchy and 
often anecdotal. For example, the decision of three companies that produce hydro-
electric power (CNFL, Energia Global and Platanar) to renew their co-sponsorship of 
FONAFIFO and the national PSA scheme in Costa Rica is taken as evidence by some 
that the scheme must have improved water quality. A more cynical view might be 
that continued support for the scheme is good for the image of these companies 
and that the costs of sponsorship are easily absorbed.
The 2002 review noted that there were limited data to enable attribution of 
causality, and substantial problems in doing so (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). 
After five years the situation appears to have changed very little – there is still very 
limited evidence and data to suggest that payments for watershed services do 
contribute to improved land management and improvements in either water quality 
or quantity for downstream users (Porras et al., 2008; Wunder et al., 2008). This also 
means that it is very difficult to assess other claims about PWS mechanisms – for 
example, that they can be cost-effective mechanisms (Wunder et al., 2008).
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0 Land use and hydrology: what links are scientifically proven?31
Some land-use–hydrology linkages that are reasonably well accepted scientifically include: 
l Intact natural vegetation cover guarantees optimum streamflow under given geo-climatic 
conditions. It also provides optimum regulation of seasonal flows by protecting the soil 
such that erosion and stream sediment loads are moderated.
l Intact natural vegetation cover is likely to provide favourable streamflow, regulate 
seasonal flows, and limit erosion and stream sediment loads. It can therefore act as a 
baseline provider of hydrological services against which other forms of land use can be 
assessed.
l Montane cloud forests and related cloud-affected ecosystems such as páramos provide 
maximum streamflow due to high rainfall, water captured from clouds by vegetation, and 
low soil-water use due to reduced transpiration given frequent fog.
l Intact natural vegetation cover does not guarantee protection against floods or landslides, 
especially in large-scale watersheds and under extreme weather events, but it does 
reduce their frequency compared to converted land-use cover. This is particularly the case 
with respect to flooding in smaller-scale watersheds and for small- and medium-sized 
storm flow.  
l Removal of old-growth forest at large scales (1,000 to 10,000km2) in humid areas reduces 
rainfall during the transition between wet and dry seasons. The effects are modest 
averaged over the year (5 to 10 per cent) but are more noticeable during the transition.
l Removal of forest increases annual water yield (by 100–800mm for a 100 per cent change 
in cover) initially and in the short-term; the size of change depends on rainfall and degree 
of surface disturbance. Subsequent water yield depends on the new land cover.
l Low flows are increased by conversion of forest to non-forest cover, provided soil 
degradation is limited and annual precipitation is ~2,000mm.
l Low flows are likely to be reduced by conversion of forest to other uses, if soil degradation 
has caused overland flow to exceed 15–20 per cent of rainfall. Typically, this degraded 
stage is reached after prolonged exposure of bare soil, by intensive grazing, by the use 
of heavy machinery, too frequent or very hot fires, improper tillage regimes, and by the 
introduction of compacted surfaces such as roads.
l Reforestation can initially result in less streamflow, due to the high use of water by 
growing trees. Reforestation does not re-create the ecological conditions of old-growth 
forest within the lifespan of most PWS programmes.
l Reforestation is unlikely to reduce the risk of flooding to the same degree as the 
former old-growth forest because the recovery of degraded soils often takes several 
decades. In addition, the impacts of development (such as roads or housing) on drainage 
infrastructure are not undone by tree planting.
l Establishing forest on crop- or grassland leads to reductions in low flows unless there is a 
sufficiently large improvement in infiltration after reforestation to offset the extra water 
use by trees. For example, to compensate for the use of 300mm of extra rainfall by trees, 
a 30 per cent switch from overland flow to infiltration is needed under annual rainfall of 
1000mm/year to break even. This is only likely where surface soils are partly degraded 
yet deep enough to store the extra infiltrated water.
31. These results were discussed and compiled during the ‘Bellagio Conversations’ (Asquith and Wunder, 
2008) and draw heavily on the summary description in Bruijnzeel (2004).
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In summary: from a scientific perspective there is very little quantitative evidence 
to link PWS to changes in water quality and/or quantity. There are three reasons for 
this. Firstly, PWS schemes are seldom developed with substantive baselines against 
which it might be possible to measure change; secondly, in developing countries 
there is often insufficient monitoring of river and streamflow to allow sufficient data 
sets to be developed to show causality; and finally, few PWS schemes have been 
running for long enough to facilitate the type of land-use changes that will lead to 
substantive impacts on the quality or quantity of water. However, the complexity of 
land-use and water relationships should not be used as an excuse to avoid PWS-type 
solutions. Small-scale innovations with a commitment to adaptive management can 
provide a starting point in many cases.
Relationships between land-use and water are often more complex than they seem – but local 
initiatives can get to grips with them
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4  Lessons from experience: on payments, 
watersheds, livelihoods and sustainability 
Action-learning is a messy business. People try things and sometimes fail. An 
unexpected event may trigger a rethink of the whole approach. But people keep 
thinking and keep trying. This generates a wealth of experience from which 
lessons can be drawn. The multi-country action-learning initiative described in this 
report was designed specifically to increase our understanding of the role of the 
market in promoting the provision of watershed services to improve livelihoods. 
To recap, two main methodological approaches have been pursued. Firstly, 
research teams in six developing countries collaborated to shape the emergence 
of PWS mechanisms at selected sites, commissioning baseline studies, carrying 
out necessary research to help move things along as well as facilitating and 
negotiating potential PWS arrangements. Secondly, experience from some 50 PWS 
cases around the world was collated and analysed. This penultimate section of the 
report offers some overall lessons learned from our work. 
An initial conclusion worth emphasis is that developing PWS is an extremely 
challenging and complex task. By implication there is still a lot to learn. We can 
also conclude up-front that, with a few exceptions, it appears that the direct 
livelihood impacts from PWS are as yet generally very limited. Furthermore, 
although PWS schemes have generally been developed primarily as a tool 
to deal with environmental challenges, there is little evidence of substantial 
success in this so far. Below, we look a little deeper into the picture this 
experience paints. In each of the following sub-sections, framed by a key 
question, we attempt a summary conclusion from the evidence, followed by one 
or more explanatory lessons. 
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There are better ways of reducing poverty than PWS: new PWS mechanisms 
were developed at two sites in Indonesia and one in India, while the initiative 
also supported and strengthened an emerging scheme in Bolivia (Munawir and 
Vermeulen, 2007; Agarwal et al., 2008; Asquith and Vargas, 2007). In all cases the 
payments from buyers of watershed services to suppliers of watershed services 
were modest and may not continue beyond the short term (Table 3). This suggests 
that there may be better and more effective mechanisms for reducing poverty. 
For example, halting or changing policies that directly harm poor people, or that 
have harmed them in the past, can bring dramatic results. Since poverty and 
landlessness are often closely correlated, PWS schemes have limited potential for 
poverty reduction since benefits generally accrue to the landed and not the landless 
(Porras et al., 2008). Experience from the Caribbean suggests that, where they can 
be developed, PWS mechanisms will only address the livelihoods of de jure and de 
facto landowners (McIntosh and Leotaud, 2007). In the Ga-Selati catchment, South 
Africa, landlessness and poverty are largely due to the apartheid land policies of 
the governments before 1994. It is only once these inequalities have been dealt 
with and other constraints addressed that people will have the opportunity to 
improve their livelihoods (King et al., 2008). While in the Bolivia PWS sites some 
landless people have benefited through occasional employment to assist with 
processing honey (Asquith and Vargas, 2007), this is not a substantial effect. 
Indirect effects of PWS can be significant – particularly in building social capital: 
the evidence from the PWS arrangements in Bolivia, India and Indonesia indicates 
that, while the direct impacts on livelihoods are marginal, the indirect benefits that 
are created are more significant. In Bolivia, this is in the form of increased trust 
and cooperation between upstream and downstream communities (Asquith and 
Vargas, 2007). In both the Brantas and Cidanau pilots in Indonesia, a proportion of 
the income received by the farmers’ groups in the nascent PWS schemes has been 
invested in local business opportunities (e.g. goat breeding, fodder stores, nurseries). 
In these examples watershed payments are acting as sources of discretionary and 
untied financing that allows the beneficiaries to decide for themselves on the best 
4.1 Can payments for watershed services reduce poverty and  
 improve livelihoods? 
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Payments for watershed services should not be considered as a tool for 
widespread use in reducing poverty in developing countries. While evidence 
from some schemes shows modest increases in household incomes from PWS, 
the effects cannot be considered as substantial reductions in poverty. Our 
evidence does, however, suggest that indirect effects of PWS development 
have substantial potential to reduce poverty – yet these effects are rarely 
specific to PWS and could potentially be generated through alternative actions. 
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form of investment, considering local opportunities and risk (World Bank, 2002).  
As important, however, has been the apparent boost in self-determination that has 
allowed the farmers’ groups, particularly in the Brantas sites, to enter into a new 
set of diverse external partnerships with government departments, universities and 
district forest offices (Munawir and Vermeulen, 2007). 
Participants in the PWS-like agreement involving exchange of labour and planting 
material between two village development committees at the Kuhan site in 
India perceive the arrangement to have ‘a higher moral value’ compared to 
those that are contingent upon external funding. It is thought that its chances of 
sustainability are higher as a result. In an analysis of the experience to date, the 
critical role of local negotiation was highlighted as the reason why marginalised 
groups from both villages had been implicitly recognised and included in the 
arrangement (Agarwal et al., 2008). 
Astute development of PWS thus appears to build social capital – it can bring 
stakeholders together to work through key common issues and antagonisms 
that would otherwise not be resolved. Working through the complexity of issues 
typically involved in watershed relationships can itself be a major benefit. Such 
social capital can contribute to greater local empowerment – and a contract-based 
approach seems to improve the chances of significant empowerment, as parties to 
the contract take control of, and responsibility for, their own actions. 
A key – and as yet unanswered – question is whether the indirect benefits of PWS 
are sufficient to justify the investment in PWS mechanisms. Such indirect benefits 
could perhaps be better developed more directly and cost-effectively through 
other means. Furthermore, evidence of the sustainability of PWS indirect effects on 
poverty is still scarce, as is the ability to assess what would have happened in each 
case without PWS interventions (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006). It is appropriate, 
however, to identify from the evidence those key actions that would be likely to 
improve the indirect poverty-reduction effects of PWS. There are two actions that 
stand out. The first is to secure the access of local people to watershed resources 
and the services upon which they depend. The second is to reinforce, rather 
than undermine, existing state, traditional, community and private management 
systems, although this can entail major trade-offs between them.
There is little evidence of PWS doing any harm to poor people: with the 
emergence of payments and markets for ecosystem services came the concern 
that they may actually have a negative impact on poor and landless people’s 
livelihoods (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). However, in the project sites, there 
is very little evidence of any negative impacts. For example, at the Kuhan site 
in India, one family whose access to water for livestock was restricted by the 
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agreement between the two village development committees took it upon itself 
to remove the check-dam; however this is more that offset by the increase in the 
number of downstream water users (Agarwal et al., 2008). The wider analysis of 
50 PWS cases in developing countries finds little evidence of adverse impacts upon 
those participating. This holds for both the suppliers of watershed services and the 
‘buyers’ – where consumers are being required to meet some or all of the costs 
through tariffs and fees (Porras et al., 2008).
Publicly funded PWS schemes that are rolled out according to a blueprint plan are 
more likely to impact negatively on some participants since these schemes lack 
the capacity for local adaptation and negotiation. There is, for example, evidence 
of coercion of participants, undermining of local livelihoods, and rent-seeking by 
officials in the implementation of the SLCP in China (Li et al., 2007; Bennett, 2008). 
Conversely, in Mexico’s national programme, PSAH, 78 per cent of the payments 
have been made to people who are living in areas that are highly marginalised 
(Munôz-Pina et al., 2008). But in practice there is still a bias against the ‘poorest 
of the poor’ even within these areas. Consequently, measures are being taken to 
ensure that the poorest are more effectively targeted by future PSAH payments 
(Muñoz-Pina et al., 2008).
Effective targeting can make PWS programmes better at alleviating poverty: 
there is evidence that facilitators of PWS schemes are learning from their 
experiences and there are ‘second generation’ PWS schemes that are being set 
up with specific poverty reduction and livelihood objectives (Porras et al., 2008). 
Examples include programmes such as RUPES in Asia and Cuencas Andinas in 
South America, in addition to Mexico’s PSAH mentioned above. These programmes 
are considering wider contexts of land use, for instance by including potentially 
sustainable agriculture and agro-forestry options in the schemes, rather than just 
those linked directly to forests (Porras et al., 2008). Their success will also depend 
on identifying and targeting the poorest cohort of residents within a catchment. 
This, in turn, will require innovation in payment mechanisms where the poorest 
have no land. In this respect, South Africa’s Working for Water Programme is 
an educative example – it provides employment opportunities in areas of high 
unemployment, and its consistent funding by government (funding from poverty 
alleviation sources) is testament to the political success that it enjoys in South 
Africa (Turpie et al., 2008).
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Environmental impacts causally attributable to PWS schemes appear to be 
limited. There is little evidence from the action-learning sites to suggest 
that payments for watershed services have had a significant effect on land 
management and water indicators – although the schemes are generally still 
in their infancy and at pilot scale. While some schemes around the world are 
promising in this regard, our review work generally confirms this picture of 
very limited environmental effects.  
Complexity of relationships between land use and water is the norm: across 
the project countries and sites there was no common or single cause of land-use 
change or reduced water quality and quantity. Causal and quantified relationships 
between land use and indicators of water quality and/or quantity – the basis of a 
PWS mechanism – were, and are, complex and difficult to establish. In South Africa, 
robust estimates for the volume of water that could be ‘saved’ were provided 
for the Ga-Selati and Sabie-Sand catchments (Chapman, 2006 and 2007). These 
were possible because in South Africa there are strong time-series data sets on 
streamflow, substantial bodies of scientific work on water use by alien invasive 
species, and a broad pool of specialist hydrological expertise. These conditions are 
seldom evident in other developing countries (Calder, 2005).
The complexity of the land-use–water relationships is highlighted by examples from 
the Caribbean and India. Analysis of water quality data from the Buff Bay/Pencar 
catchment in St Lucia showed no difference as a result of investment in catchments 
management activities (Cox, 2004). At the scale of the Bhoj Wetlands in India, it 
proved to be very difficult, for both analytical and political reasons, to differentiate 
between rural and urban sources of pollution (Agarwal et al., 2008). In China 
there is an all-pervasive view that tree planting is good for watersheds and that 
reforestation will reduce the substantial rates of soil erosion in the Yangtze and 
Yellow river basins (Bennett, 2008). However there is a very tenuous causal link 
between reforestation of sloping lands and the devastating floods that occur with 
regular frequency (and that were, indeed, the stimulus for the implementation of 
the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme in the first place) (Bennett, 2008). 
Scientific evidence is often weak – but locally logical and fair action may still be 
feasible: the fact that changes in land use can affect water quantity (of streamflow 
and groundwater), water quality, and the evenness of flow is generally not 
contested. The debate and constraints to developing actions affecting watershed 
services are centred on the difficulties of pinpointing and sufficiently quantifying 
these relationships. While broad rules exist, precise relationships between land use 
4.2 What has been the impact of payments for watershed  
 services on water and land management?
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and water will be site-specific due to the unique interaction of topography, scale, 
climate, infrastructure and existing land-use systems (see Box 10). Nonetheless, 
a common understanding of the likely effects of land-use change upon hydrology 
is fundamental to the potential success of many payment mechanisms. Buyers of 
watershed services are unlikely to make payments unless they are confident that 
the agreed land-use change will bring about desired changes in water quality or 
quantity downstream. 
However, public perceptions about the links between land use and water flows are 
sometimes at odds with scientific findings. So in addition to ‘getting the science 
right’, PWS initiatives need to be based on what local stakeholders perceive to 
be logical, fair and feasible. Trade-offs between public perception and scientific 
knowledge may thus occur. The experience from across the project’s sites on the 
need for, and the precision of, hydrological relationships is varied. In Indonesia, 
the two pilot sites were developed without supporting hydrological evidence, 
largely because re-establishing tree-cover is widely regarded as the appropriate 
intervention due to the large-scale loss of forest cover (Munawir and Vermeulen, 
2007). In the Caribbean, the hydrological analysis of the Buff Bay/Pencar watershed 
showed that there was no measurable impact of conservation activities initiated by 
a voluntary group. But it has also noted that there is very little ongoing hydrological 
research into the impact of reforestation programmes, and that most of it is based 
on the broad assumption that more trees will improve the watershed services 
in a broad sense (McIntosh and Leotaud, 2007). A hydrological study in Kuhan 
challenged local perceptions about the areas within the micro-catchment to be 
protected (Agarwal et al., 2008). The results of the survey formed the basis for the 
agreement to rehabilitate 12 hectares of land that had been used as a grazing area. 
While the evidence from the project sites is contradictory on just how much, and 
how precise, hydrological information needs to be to develop a PWS mechanism, 
an alternative approach is one of adaptive management. The challenge of 
managing complex systems (like watersheds) and/or the absence of precise causal 
relationships can be overcome by adopting an adaptive management approach 
(Holling, 1978; Westley, 2002). For adaptive management to be successful, however, 
some conditions have to be met. Firstly, there is a need for clear objectives – the 
more clearly the objectives are defined, the easier it is to identify the minimum 
amount of data needed from monitoring. Secondly, such monitoring and evaluation 
needs to be followed through to show whether the objectives are being achieved 
or whether adjustments are needed. 
The scheme at Los Negros in Bolivia demonstrates the advantages of clear 
objectives that provide relatively straightforward monitoring approaches. 
Such monitoring raises transaction costs, but perhaps not as much as trying to 
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implement blueprint schemes that falter through lack of information and feedback. 
In some cases, monitoring costs can be reduced by use of proxy indicators. For 
example in the Bolivian case, downstream farmers are concerned primarily about 
the number of days in which there is no flow. It has thus been suggested that it 
may not actually be necessary to measure water quantity or even flow volumes. 
Flow is lowest in July, so it may be that documenting the number of days then 
when there is no flow, or even basing the assessment on perceptions of whether 
water is available for more days in July, may be an adequate basis for monitoring 
the PWS scheme. It is usually perceptions of change that are important, at least 
initially, as a stimulus for action. Detailed measurement can often come later, when 
the need for more precise data is more clearly defined.
Targeting critical areas within watersheds will increase the effectiveness of 
PWS mechanisms: the land within watersheds is not homogenous – within each 
watershed there are critical and less critical areas depending on the nature of the 
improvements that are sought. If the hydrology can be well understood, targeting 
these areas will increase the effectiveness of PWS mechanisms. In Kuhan, India, a 
process of consultation, mapping and rapid hydrological assessment identified the 
12-hectare site that was the source of silt (Agarwal et al., 2008). There is some 
evidence that ‘second generation’ PWS schemes – which are more focused on 
livelihoods – are paying more attention to hydrological understanding and targeting 
of critical areas (Porras et al., 2008). Recent advances in remote sensing and 
modelling have substantially improved these prospects (Calder, 2005). Improved 
measurements and better hydrological models are also being used to dispel 
some of the myths around forests and land use. For example, it is now generally 
accepted that forest cover only influences rainfall at massive scales, e.g. at the level 
of the Congo or Amazon basins, while the role of cloud forest in intercepting rainfall 
and thereby contributing to streamflow is smaller than originally believed (Calder, 
2005; Bruijnzeel, 2004).  
Payments for watershed services have limited physical applicability: globally, the 
scale and extent of land-use change over the last 50 years has been enormous and, 
in some senses, relatively uncontested (Adams and Jeanrenaud, 2008). Over the 
next 50 years, the rate of land-use change may well increase with, for example, an 
extensification of cultivation due to climate change and expansions in land areas 
devoted to feed-stocks for bio-fuels. Large areas of sub-Saharan Africa are expected 
to become more arid with the likelihood of demographic changes, diverse land-
based survival strategies, and extension of cultivation into ever more marginal 
areas. Under these conditions the competition for water, and the interactions 
between water and land use, are going to become even more important (Mayers 
et al., 2009). The complexity of the causal relationships and the socio-economic 
conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to develop a PWS mechanism that 
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Awareness of market opportunities is low – third parties can play key roles: 
individual farmers and upstream land managers generally have little sense of how 
their collective uses of land and water impact on users further downstream. This 
disconnection is exacerbated by greater physical distances between farmers and 
water users, such as the common distances between the uplands and urban areas. 
Furthermore, the supply of watershed services is often governed by non-linear 
relationships between variables and thresholds; these make it very difficult – even 
for expert hydrologists – to predict how and when a service might change. Thus it 
is not surprising that there is very little awareness within communities of upstream 
farmers that they may be able to participate in an economic transaction for the 
supply of watershed services. For a large majority of farmers in upland areas, issues 
of land use are more often than not associated with governments (either central or 
local) trying to achieve objectives through the imposition of restrictive legislation. 
Evidence from the project’s action-learning sites suggests that the opportunities 
for developing a relationship based on a payment are weakly perceived by both 
suppliers and users of watershed services. That potential buyers and suppliers of 
watershed services are typically brought together by intermediary organisations 
rather than through spontaneous interaction seems to confirm this. The global 
review of PWS cases illustrates how difficult it is to identify the key drivers of a 
local scheme, especially when its scale is small. Between 2002 and 2006, the 
available data indicate that there was an increase in the number of PWS initiatives 
that have been driven by the suppliers of watershed services. However, the 
authors attribute this largely to the willingness of donor agencies to consider PWS 
mechanisms for poverty alleviation. While some schemes may appear supply-
driven, they are in essence facilitated and motivated by a third party.
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To change farmers’ behaviour, payments for watershed services must be 
competitive with existing and perceived future net returns to land and labour. 
However, insufficient connections between suppliers and users of watershed 
services, coupled with social resistance to payment mechanisms in some 
contexts, are major barriers that intermediary organisations often find difficult 
to overcome.
stands the test of time, suggest that the applicability of such mechanisms is limited 
to a quite small range of environments. For example, a biophysical and socio-
economic review of Bolivia watersheds suggested that payment-like mechanisms 
for the management of dry-season water quality and quantity would only be 
worth pursuing in about ten out of over a hundred ‘sub-watersheds’ in the country 
(Asquith and Vargas, 2007).
4.3 What factors affect the supply of watershed services? 
Fair deals for watershed services 75
Payments need to be big enough to create a real incentive for change: farmers 
in catchments are making individual land-use decisions on the basis of their 
perceptions of the net returns from different activities (Dobbs and Pretty, 2008). 
In an upstream landscape differentiated by slope, vegetation cover, soil type and 
land use, the key questions are often around the exact changes and the total 
cost of the changes required from farmers in order to effect land-use change and 
to release a payment. Under some circumstances, payments are unlikely to be 
sufficient to persuade farmers to radically alter their current land use, especially 
in developing countries (Wunder, 2005). Therefore, intensively cultivated land 
on Java, Indonesia, is unlikely to be wholly reforested. The project has shown, 
however, that farmers may use small payments to collectively replant areas 
that have been severely degraded through erosion on which the opportunity 
costs of change are low (Munawir and Vermeulen, 2007). Similarly, relatively 
modest payments may also limit the extensification of farmers into areas of 
natural vegetation cover (e.g. in Los Negros, Bolivia). The project’s activities in 
the Caribbean show that payments in watershed schemes there are unlikely to 
be high enough, even where there is a demand, to get farmers to switch from 
traditional crops like coffee, or illegal crops like marijuana, because the current 
returns from these crops are so high (McIntosh and Leotaud, 2007). 
Cultural factors can constrain the development of PWS: cultural factors of many 
forms can have direct and indirect effects on land use. The antipathy in many 
places to the whole concept of ‘payments’ is due to its apparent alignment with 
economic liberalisation and structural adjustment programmes that were led by 
the Bretton Woods institutions. The hostility towards notions of payments and 
markets has led to the use of a range of alternative terms such as ‘rewards’ and 
‘compensation’ for watershed services (Wunder, 2005). But all terms transmit 
slightly different signals to stakeholders. ‘Rewards’ has overtones of paternalism 
(but also of entitlement, justice and equality) and runs the risk of raising excessive 
expectations. ‘Compensation’ meanwhile implies that only those who bear a cost 
should benefit. In India, the project team preferred to use the term incentive-based 
mechanisms, implying a broader form of PES (Agarwal et al., 2008).
The diagnostic studies in Bolivia reveal a polarised view of water. Indigenous 
highland Bolivians view water as a ‘universal and communal right (that) should 
be distributed equitably according to the needs, traditions and community norms 
that respect the water cycle” (Miranda, 2007, quoted in Asquith and Vargas, 2007). 
Elsewhere in the country, communities have developed longstanding mechanisms 
for exchanging water rights. The failed privatisation of the ailing Cochabamba 
municipal water supply company that led to nationwide protests against market-
led water solutions also played an important role in the general hostility towards 
incentives associated with water.
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Private sector demand for watershed services is still low: willingness to pay for 
watershed services is a prerequisite for demand and therefore a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for the development of PWS (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; 
Wunder, 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005). Out of ten ‘best-bet’ sites, our project was able 
to develop pilot PWS mechanisms in three and support an existing mechanism in 
a fourth. However, in these project countries in general, there is little evidence of 
widespread demand for PWS schemes as a solution to the twin challenges of land 
management and the provision of water. 
In South Africa, despite what appeared to be a very favourable set of conditions for 
the development of PWS mechanisms, there was clearly very little appetite for PWS 
solutions within the selected catchments. One explanation for the low demand is 
that policy reform around land and water has generated considerable uncertainty 
amongst potential buyers. Consequently, addressing long-term water issues was 
not a pressing issue for the commercial farmers in the Ga-Selati catchment (King et 
al., 2008). The situation was further complicated by perverse water pricing, which 
meant that at least one potential buyer could achieve the same objective with 
substantially lower risks by buying water through inter-basin transfers (Wise and 
Musango, 2006). This highlights not only the perversity of water-pricing, despite 
the extensive water reform process, but also the preponderance of supply-side 
engineering solutions to water management in South Africa (King et al., 2008).
The development of PWS mechanisms in the Caribbean at the Buff Bay and Pencar 
sites was constrained by the unwillingness of water users to pay for watershed 
services. As in South Africa, water pricing was an issue. In Saint Lucia and Jamaica, 
water is essentially subsidised and there is substantial consumer resistance to 
any increases in the cost of water. Under these circumstances it is very difficult to 
envisage how payments for watershed services could be developed. Still, within the 
Caribbean there was a sense that the tourism sector would be more willing to pay 
for land management practices that ensured clean water and avoided the silting 
up of reefs. But within the tourism sector there is a sense that taxation is already 
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Demands on watersheds are growing, and increasingly competing with each 
other. In nearly every watershed, in nearly every country, water quality and 
quantity are deteriorating because of increasing demands and changes in 
land use. The concept of someone paying for ecosystem services is relatively 
new, and the existence of a compelling ‘business case’ for them to do so is 
relatively rare. While demand in Africa remains low, there is considerable 
proliferation of schemes in Latin America and Asia.  
4.4 How much demand is there for watershed services? 
Fair deals for watershed services 77
heavy and that it is government’s job to ensure appropriate land management 
that protects the integrity of the coastline upon which the tourism sector is based 
(McIntosh and Leotaud, 2007). In some situations the private sector may already be 
making regulatory payments – e.g. payments for catchment area treatment made by 
larger hydro-electric projects in India. Here the focus needs to be on complementing 
business-as-usual tree-planting and engineering activities to completing the PES 
cycle and recognising upstream communities as service providers.
Notwithstanding the very limited demand for PWS within the project countries, 
there has been a global growth in PWS as a tool. Porras et al. (2008), note 
that there has been a ‘remarkable growth in the number of PWS schemes and 
proposals, particularly in Latin America and Asia’ – but many fewer, and hardly any 
private sector-led, in Africa. 
Publicly funded schemes can constrain or stimulate privately funded schemes: 
in China, for example, interest in market-based PWS schemes has soared amongst 
the educated and political elites in recent years. The huge investment in a diverse 
set of incentive-driven land management programmes is tangible evidence of the 
importance that government has attached to incentive-driven changes in land 
management. At a national level, payments for watershed services are clearly 
enunciated in the 11th Five Year Development Plan (National Development and 
Reform Commission, 2006). Yet the overriding dominance of the large government 
programmes has meant that local innovation and the opportunities for privately 
or user-funded PWS schemes has been limited (Li et al., 2007). Similarly, in 
South Africa some have noted that the government-funded Working for Water 
programme, while providing important employment opportunities and having 
significant ecological benefits, has also effectively constrained the development of 
privately funded processes (King et al., 2008).
Conversely, in Costa Rica, the government’s programme (PSAH) has provided the 
leadership for similar initiatives by the private sector (Porras et al., 2008). It is 
estimated that there are now about 14 privately or user-funded schemes in Costa 
Rica (Porras et al., 2008). And while Working for Water predominates in South 
Africa, some commentators note possible catalytic links between it and individual 
user-funded PWS schemes that are now starting to emerge (Turpie et al., 2008).
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Diverse payments and payment mechanisms are a response to local conditions: 
the type of payments, the mechanisms by which they are made and their frequency, 
varied considerably even within the small sample of action-learning sites. Cash 
payments were made to farmers’ groups at the Indonesian sites in Brantas and 
Cidanau catchments, while payments between buyers and sellers in Los Negros 
(Bolivia) and Kuhan (India) were not cash payments. In three of the four cases 
payments were made using intermediaries. Only in Kuhan did the transaction take 
place directly between buyers and sellers. The frequency of these payments also 
varied between the sites: in Bolivia annual payments have been made; in Kuhan 
there has been a one-off payment; and in the Indonesian cases payments have been 
made over fixed areas for fixed periods, with options for renewal. This diversity is 
typical of the user-funded PWS mechanisms that are small, flexible and can respond 
to local conditions. The international review of local schemes shows that most 
schemes fall into one of two categories. Where cash payments are made, these are 
generally paid on an annual basis while in-kind payments tended to be one-off.
In contrast, large publicly funded PWS schemes tend to use simple, generally 
financial payment mechanisms that tend to be based on flat rates with little spatial 
differentiation (Porras et al., 2008). However the national PWS scheme in Costa 
Rica differentiates between land uses, with different rates being paid for forest 
conservation, reforestation, and agro-forestry. Similarly in Mexico there are different 
rates of payment for cloud forest and other forest types (Munôz-Pina et al., 2008).
Differentiated payments within a scheme can be effective practically: amongst 
PWS mechanisms, our limited data point to a high level of payment diversity within 
schemes. In other related disciplines (such as community-based natural resource 
management) there has been considerable debate over the equality and allocation 
of natural resource-based revenues within communities and the potential dangers 
of ‘elite capture’ (see Child et al., 2004; Fabricius, 2004; Hulme and Murphree, 
2001). The limited evidence from this project suggests that payments need not 
necessarily be equal as long as they are perceived to be fair. Simple measures of 
area or distance from a river or stream, modified perhaps by slope, may prove 
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There is considerable diversity in the method and frequency of payments 
in emerging PWS schemes – from cash to in-kind payments, and from one-
off to regular payments. Intermediaries and administrators play key roles 
in determining the price. Asymmetries in power, resources and information 
between stakeholders suggest that efficient price determination mechanisms 
are unlikely to develop in the near future.
4.5 What kinds of payments are being made in emerging  
 PWS schemes?
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to be sufficient proxies to design credible but differentiated PWS schemes. For 
example, in Los Negros farmers accepted differentiated payments both by area 
and by the type of forest that they are conserving (Asquith et al., 2008). Those in 
the cloud forest zone received US$ 3 ha-1 compared with US$2.25 ha-1 in the moist 
forest, because it is perceived that the protection of cloud forest provides greater 
watershed services than the moist forest and other vegetation types (Asquith et 
al., 2008). That farmers living outside the cloud forest zone accepted this without 
complaint suggests both an appreciation of the value of cloud forests, and an 
appreciation of the importance of the conditionality in a contract-based system. 
Such differentiated payments may not work so well in other environments where 
the impacts of different land uses are less clearly perceived.
Prices are yet to be determined by ‘the market’ – administrators and 
intermediaries dominate: theory tells us that market-based transactions between 
willing buyers and willing sellers of watershed services will lead to cost-effective 
outcomes and the efficient use of resources (Wunder, 2005; Engel et al., 2008; 
Claassen et al., 2008). Our sample, although small, suggests that in reality price 
determination is a lot messier than in theory. The small intra-village example 
of Kuhan in India is the only example of where there were not substantial 
asymmetries of power and influence between relatively powerful buyers and 
relatively weak sellers. Here, in-kind payments have been negotiated and modified 
over a considerable period. 
In the global review’s sample of 38 locally or user-defined schemes, prices 
were administratively determined in 18 cases while in 17 cases there was some 
negotiation between buyers and sellers, albeit conducted through an intermediary. 
In just three cases was there direct negotiation between the buyers and the sellers. 
In contrast, publicly funded schemes are, as one would expect, characterised by 
administrative (non-negotiable) pricing. In practice, the review showed that it is not 
unusual for there to be a combination of price discovery mechanisms. For example, 
in the national scheme in Costa Rica, although payment levels to providers are set for 
the national programmes, payments made by water users are determined through 
negotiations with the government agency administering the scheme, while local 
facilitators help bridge the gap to local farmers and water users (Porras et al., 2008).
The evidence to date suggests that, at present, price discovery processes between 
buyers and sellers of watershed services are yet to reach such maturity – with 
current arrangements characterised by simple and often administratively determined 
prices. The asymmetries in terms of power, resources and information that exist 
between the stakeholders in these examples suggest that cost-effective and efficient 
price discovery mechanisms have not yet been developed (Ferraro, 2008).
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Transition payments may be more realistic than in-perpetuity payments: again, 
in theory, payments for ecosystem services are predicated on the basis that there 
are strong externalities and that costs and benefits are not location-specific (Engel 
et al., 2008). This implies that payments need to be regular and sustained to 
ensure that sellers do not revert to previous, less desirable (to the buyer) land-
use practices. But some changes may only require a one-off payment, or period 
of payments, before they can be sustained. Our review of watershed payments 
in developing countries showed that government schemes tend to make regular 
annual payments, while the local- or user-funded initiatives are split between 
regular payments and one-off, and/or in-kind payments. The evidence from 
the project sites is too sparse to be able to conclude on the efficacy of different 
payments methods. However, developing tools to assess the efficacy of different 
payment models will be an important line of inquiry in the future – especially with 
the growing interest in PES-based options for addressing greenhouse gas emissions 
and climate change. 
A wide variety of other incentives for watershed management are in play 
that may one day lead to PWS: in many of the countries explored through the 
project there are a range of incentives for watershed management. Typically 
these do not specifically construct a payments relationship as envisaged by the 
PWS models, but take the form of indirect benefits from the state. These benefits 
include, for instance, free provision of tree seedlings to land managers, tax credits 
for tree planting or water conservation activities, and grants to community-
based organisations. While these activities are seldom recognised as prototype 
PWS mechanisms, they do represent incentives to land managers and may have 
conservation and livelihood benefits that in the long term offer a basis upon which 
to build more direct relationships. The potential constraints – both to their own 
sustainability and to their efficacy as routes to PWS – would appear to be that most 
are government-led, administratively priced, and display little if any contingency 
– some even involve farmers participating involuntarily. 
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Some governments (like those in China, Costa Rica, Mexico and South Africa) 
have become buyers of watershed services; all governments, through policy 
and legal frameworks, are critical for shaping how PWS schemes develop. 
Land and resource tenure is particularly important – but much policy and 
law is contradictory or ineffective. PWS protagonists may be able to help 
governments consider the appropriate balance between efficiency and equity 
in policy and law. 
Government legal and policy frameworks shape what is possible in PWS 
schemes: payments for watershed services do not take place in a political or legal 
vacuum. The roles and degrees of influence of government depend on the nature 
and scope of government on the one hand, and on the scale of the payments for 
watershed services scheme on the other. The direct influence of government on 
small, local schemes may be minimal, especially if government itself has already 
devolved authority for watershed and natural resource management to local levels 
(e.g. the weak devolution in Himachal Pradesh, India), or if its influence just does 
not extend that far (e.g. Los Negros, Bolivia). In contrast, very large schemes 
may be wholly dominated by government policy and practice, since no other 
organisation has the necessary reach or mandate to encompass and integrate 
multiple jurisdictions (e.g. China, and to a lesser extent South Africa). 
In intermediate-sized schemes there appears to be a higher likelihood of 
government policies meeting local aspirations. Where these two differ, the need for 
compromise arises. This is clearly seen in the case of Indonesia, where government 
agencies (national in the case of the Brantas watershed, provincial in the case of 
the Cidanau catchment) are working with local people, the private sector and NGOs 
to take on board and reconcile differing perceptions, concerns and interests. 
The legislative framework that governs issues of tenure, security, and the drafting 
and enforcement of contracts is also crucial to ensuring fair deals – or to obstructing 
them, depending on how the legislation is formulated and applied. Defining and 
upholding tenure rights (both ownership and use rights) is important not only in 
PWS schemes but in other contexts as well. In Indonesia, the emergence of PWS 
schemes has helped to consolidate government support to entrench user rights, 
though ownership rights still remain unclear and unresolved. Where there are 
divergent policies (e.g. China, where the agricultural and forestry policies are 
contradictory), governments can work to reconcile these (Sun and Chen, 2006b). 
Legislation that is conducive to the formation of politically credible committees, 
groupings or agencies that have the power to enable user-provider engagement, is 
also critical (e.g. Indonesia and South Africa).
4.6 What role does government play in the development of  
 payments for watershed services? 
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Government-financed PWS schemes have advantages and drawbacks: 
government PWS schemes tend to be large in scale, ignoring much variation 
amongst people and places, and instituting PWS as a blueprint rather than as a set 
of interim arrangements to be shaped by local circumstances. Such schemes may 
be less efficient (because of more layers of bureaucracy, also because they cannot 
demand the levels of contingency that PWS implies); they can lead to rent-seeking 
behaviour (because of weak checks and balances in that bureaucracy); and they 
may be incapable of meeting the needs of the very poor. However, good examples 
can be found: the Working for Water programme in South Africa has achieved some 
notable successes and in China some local governments are exploring the creation 
of incentives through negotiated and differentiated payments with local groupings 
under the Ecological Forest Compensation Fund.
Government policy is frequently fragmented and often perverse: typically 
government policy towards water and land management is fragmented and 
often characterised by contradictory approaches leading to perverse outcomes. 
In the Caribbean, the plethora of laws and regulations pertaining to land use 
and water management contribute to the high levels of landscape degradation 
and soil erosion (McIntosh and Leotaud, 2007). The situation is exacerbated by 
policy contradictions such as subsidies to agricultural inputs that promote the 
extensification of cultivation in inappropriate places (McIntosh and Leotaud, 2007). 
Policy contradictions are very evident in China where, on the one hand, 
government is a major buyer of environmental services through the Sloping Lands 
Conversion Programme and other programmes, and on the other hand food self-
sufficiency is a major government policy (Li et al., 2007). These two policies are 
in direct conflict with each other, one result being highly compromised efforts to 
reduce cultivation on steep slopes in areas of low agricultural potential and erosion-
prone soils (Sun and Chen, 2006a). The development of payment mechanisms 
can also be limited by overlapping and multiple administrative jurisdictions. This 
is particularly evident in the Bhoj Wetlands in India, where there are multiple 
administrative bodies operating at different geographical scales; these include 
rural village-level panchayats32 and district governments, as well as the Bhopal 
Municipal Council (Agarwal et al., 2008).
Government’s role in defining and upholding land ownership is particularly 
critical: secure land tenure is frequently cited as a necessary condition for many 
environment and development activities, including developing watershed services. 
32. The Panchayat is a South Asian political system mainly in India, Pakistan and Nepal. ‘Panchayat’ 
means assembly (yat) of five (panch) wise and respected elders chosen and accepted by the village 
community (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Village_panchayats).
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Without tenure, owners of land cannot be identified whereas weak tenure limits 
investment in land management and conservation. From our action-learning sites 
the most striking impact of land insecurity was not on the supply-side but amongst 
the potential buyers of watershed services in the Ga-Selati catchment in South 
Africa. Here, post-apartheid land reform meant that farmers had other pressing 
concerns over and above developing long-term measures to ensure additional 
water (King et al., 2008).  
In Bolivia, formal rights to land are extremely rare but Fundación Natura 
successfully developed the Los Negros scheme by recognising de facto rights 
(Asquith and Vargas, 2007). Similarly in Indonesia, the PWS pilots were developed 
in areas with few formal land rights. There is a sense, however, that the PWS 
mechanisms contributed to a process that consolidated user rights, though 
ownership rights still remain unclear and unresolved (Munawir and Vermeulen, 
2007). In India, unclear local control over government forest land in the catchment 
of Kuhan was one reason why farmers preferred to focus on controlling grazing 
on private lands as the more feasible option (Agarwal et al., 2008). Evidence from 
the PWS review suggests that in most payments schemes, both at a national and 
at a user-funded level, payments are being made to private landholders – the 
implication being that PWS schemes are not generally being developed in situations 
of communal or unclear tenure. 
Balancing regulation and incentives, equity and efficiency, is easier said than 
done: incentive-led approaches to land and water management are considered by 
some to have greater potential for efficient and effective outcomes than regulatory 
approaches (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Pagiola, 2005). Regulation, and in 
particular the declaration of protected areas, has been a very effective means, until 
relatively recently, of protecting watersheds and upper catchments. The problem is 
that large-scale land-use changes outside of protected areas have left them isolated 
and often unable to fulfil their original objectives. In the Caribbean, the challenges 
and the costs associated with developing PWS mechanisms strongly suggest that 
they are not an effective substitute for land-use planning and associated regulation 
(McIntosh and Leotaud, 2007). Overall, however, the project has not been able to 
shed much light on the appropriate mix and relationship between incentives and 
regulatory approaches to land and water management. 
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Using existing institutions can reduce transaction costs: transaction costs can be 
defined ‘as all those costs associated with buying and selling in a market’ (Bannock 
et al., 1991). In the context of PWS these include: agreeing on the nature, extent 
and timing of the payments or in-kind transfers; and drawing up contracts and 
monitoring the outcomes of the agreement on all parties. The level of transaction 
costs can ‘make or break the market’ (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). However, 
the simple theoretical models for PWS do not do justice to the real-life complexity 
of most catchments, where the actions of multiple stakeholders will either affect 
land or water use. There is growing evidence that transaction costs within PWS 
mechanisms might be higher than expected (Engel and Palmer, 2008). 
It might be expected that the transaction costs of setting up a PWS scheme should 
match the expected benefits from the scheme. The larger the scale of scheme, 
and the more heterogeneous and complex its elements, the higher the transaction 
costs will generally be. There is scant evidence from the action-learning process 
on transaction costs. Costs of US$23,000 over three years were estimated for the 
interventions in Los Negros, Bolivia, by Fundación Natura (Asquith and Vargas, 
2007). In other sites such figures are difficult to ascertain, but it can be noted that 
the grants to action-learning partners substantially exceed the level of payments 
facilitated in Bolivia, India and Indonesia. However, partners’ costs also included a 
diverse set of learning and dissemination activities that are not directly associated 
with the transactions.
The project’s experience from India and Indonesia shows that working through 
existing organisations, especially those on the supply side, is one way of reducing 
direct transaction costs. At both the Brantas and Cidanau sites, LP3ES and the local 
facilitating partners used existing farmers’ groups. Similarly, at Kuhan in India, the 
existing political and traditional organisations (such as the village development 
committee) were used to negotiate and implement the payment mechanism. In 
South Africa, the evidence suggests that the absence of existing partnerships and 
organisations contributed to the limited outcomes (King et al., 2008).
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Trust and transaction costs are the ‘make or break’ for PWS schemes. Existing 
local institutions are likely to be crucial, but are rarely a panacea for PWS. 
Developing, implementing and monitoring PWS mechanisms can lead to high 
transaction costs that undermine viability or compromise efficiency. Whatever 
institutional path is chosen, the key to manageable transaction costs is likely 
to lie in trust amongst stakeholders.
4.7 How can trust and transaction costs be optimised to make  
 PWS work? 
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Neutral intermediaries fulfil multiple roles: buyers and sellers of watershed 
services are generally brought together through an intermediary or broker. These 
can be government departments but are more usually from the NGO sector. If the 
costs of the intermediary are not kept to a minimum, they may greatly reduce 
the amount that is eventually paid to the sellers, or render the whole scheme 
reliant on external subsidy. This clearly begs questions of the sustainability of the 
arrangements. The structure and role of the intermediaries is therefore of great 
interest to PWS protagonists. The evidence from the case studies points to a major 
role for civil society in facilitating PWS relationships – with a wide diversity of 
organisations involved, such as users organisations, NGOs, trusts and academic 
institutions. Within the portfolio of action-learning sites it is clear that in the 
Brantas, Cidanau and Kuhan sites the existing community organisations, and their 
relationships with the facilitators or intermediaries, were critically important in 
developing the nascent PWS mechanisms. 
Installing adaptive management lowers risk but has high initial transaction 
costs: some approaches to bringing down transaction costs may increase risks. 
Agreements and contracts are focused on balancing risks amongst the parties. But 
arriving at credible agreements through adaptive processes can be transaction-
heavy. Getting the principle of adaptive management accepted in the first place 
usually requires negotiation, especially with government representatives, both 
nationally and locally, as they tend to favour blueprint approaches (e.g. in China 
and India). 
Trust between stakeholders reduces transaction costs – but it is hard to build and 
easy to lose: in Kuhan, India, facilitators used a simple hydrological assessment and 
a series of public meetings and activities33 to build a common understanding and 
trust between two neighbouring communities (Agarwal et al., 2008). Trust between 
parties helps in clarifying objectives and developing a common vision and sense of 
purpose. This is likely to be a scale issue, with trust between individuals and groups 
being possible in small-scale schemes, while trust in the process or mechanism 
may be more critical in large-scale schemes (see Appleton, 2002).
Trust can also be built through participatory research. For example in Bolivia, farmers 
have begun to collect hydrological data and, because they are ‘theirs’, their validity 
is looking more likely to be accepted. Transaction costs can also be lowered if there 
is fairly rapid convergence on points of agreement. In the Caribbean, economic 
valuation studies and other scientific data helped to raise awareness about the 
need for intervention and triggered the search for creative solutions (although these 
33. Kuhan also organised ‘eco-walks’ for children, who then presented their findings (and enthusiasm) 
to adults (Agarwal et al., 2008)
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Bee boxes: in-kind payments for watershed services in Los Negros, Bolivia
are not necessarily PWS mechanisms). In South Africa, the use of numerical data 
has been critical because important stakeholders in government and the business 
community are used to making decisions based on quantified information. 
The diagnostic studies from Bolivia also highlighted another facet of participation: 
The most recent catchment and water management programmes in Bolivia have 
been top–down and donor-led, with little relevance especially for the poorer 
residents of the target catchments (Asquith and Vargas, 2007). Typically these 
programmes and projects have failed. However, their legacy is that a new 
generation of locally and NGO-led programmes are finding it extremely difficult 
to build confidence and secure participation, especially of poorer stakeholders 
(Asquith and Vargas, 2007).
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5  Looking ahead
With nearly a decade of investigation and research by IIED and its partners into the 
links between ecosystems services, incentives and livelihoods behind us, it should 
be possible to look ahead, to make some predictions about what the future might 
hold and to suggest what can be done to try and shape it. Here we attempt this:
5.1 Keep the experiments coming, keep learning from them,  
 and keep adapting
In Section 4 we emphasised that market-based mechanisms for watershed 
services are difficult to set up, and that they should not be seen as a blueprint for 
conservation or poverty reduction. Yet despite these conclusions, we also think that 
there is strong justification for further exploration and development of payments 
for watershed services. We think that the indirect benefits of PWS schemes can be 
considerable. The evidence suggests that the relationships between stakeholders 
who explore such schemes, particularly those developed within a framework 
of contracts and contingent payments, build social capital – enabling these 
stakeholders to work through issues and resolve antagonisms in ways not available 
to some other more conventional interventions for water and land management. 
Payments for ecosystem services are likely to be most relevant where there are 
substantial externalities, i.e. a substantial proportion of the benefits and the costs 
of the current management regime accrue not to the land managers themselves, 
but to other stakeholders. Yet because of the complex relationships within a wide 
range of such stakeholders, there are few generic facts and time-tested solutions. 
Watershed processes are often site-specific and dominated by complex, random 
and often extreme events. Multiple causes and effects will always be very difficult 
to link together with certainty – even with much better information than we 
currently have – so outcomes of management actions are likewise hard to predict.
Adaptive management of PWS approaches is therefore needed – maintaining a 
flexible approach to implementation, and ensuring that research on PWS recognises 
the work that has already been done and the lessons that can be learned. Lessons 
from both positive and negative outcomes can be invaluable and interventions 
adjusted accordingly. Such adaptive approaches are best built on site-specific 
approaches to assessment that identify ecosystem functions that support provision 
of locally valued ecosystem services.
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5.2 Expect and prepare for negotiation, and a blend of  
 incentive and regulation 
Buyers, sellers and intermediaries in PWS schemes are rarely uniform in their 
opinions and powers. There are no value-neutral positions on PWS and there is no 
source of absolute evidence that surpasses all others. This, of course, is the case 
in any field where uncertainty and complexity prevail – but it is worth underlining 
in the emerging field of PWS since it strongly implies that actors need to work 
together, to treat each others’ views as legitimate, to expect change, to experiment 
and, above all, to keep questioning experience. 
PWS is a tool that will fail, or become irrelevant, if it is not integrated with wider 
regulatory approaches, broader watershed management efforts, and explicit 
attention to governance influences that shape what is possible. Policymakers need 
to consider the opportunities to ensure that future policy and legislation allow for a 
mix of both incentives and regulations to ensure the effective management of land 
and water resources.
It may be possible in some developing country contexts for PWS schemes to grow 
without strong enabling regulatory frameworks and institutional cooperation, but 
only if such schemes are small and specific. At larger scales PWS schemes can only 
effectively serve as components of diverse (and at best integrated) watershed 
strategies. It is only at small-scale initiatives that cause and effect can be 
reasonably well understood and stakeholders can become directly engaged. Work 
at this scale provides the prospect of developing the capacity and tools to respond 
to larger-scale problems in a way that is representative of, and accountable to, 
livelihood interests. Although the values placed on improvement of water quality 
are modest at this scale, the prospects and the need to integrate the right land-use 
interventions into community resource management strategies are compelling.
5.3 Ensure that capacity is built and returns to livelihoods improve
Negotiated and adaptive approaches will only be achieved if capability is steadily 
built as part of a long-term process of building appropriate institutions that can help 
ensure fair deals for watershed services. This is true from the local to the national 
scale. From our action-learning sites and country experiences it is clear that critical 
expertise is very thinly spread and in some cases absent. Initiatives to make 
relevant expertise more accessible to those engaged with watershed issues and 
interested in PWS schemes, and to develop credible rapid assessment methods and 
other negotiation support tools, are sorely needed.
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There are compelling reasons to improve the linkages between PES – and PWS in 
particular – and improved livelihoods. Firstly, there is the pressing need for diverse 
efforts to contribute to poverty reduction. Secondly, there are strong, albeit often 
complex, links between the environment and livelihoods – improved livelihoods can 
mean better environmental management. Thirdly, greater livelihood impacts are 
more likely to present greater incentives for behavioural change, thereby improving 
the efficacy of the instrument and its capacity to provide benefits. Strategies to 
improve livelihood impacts in PWS schemes include: better targeting of the poorest 
households; reducing the barriers to entry into these schemes; and creative means for 
involving landless, often the poorest, households.
5.4 Take the lessons from watersheds into the climate change arena
Conservation of forest, woodlands and land is currently high on many peoples’ 
agenda due to the recognition of the links between deforestation and greenhouse 
gas production. It is estimated that approximately 17 per cent of all global 
greenhouse gas emissions are caused by land-use change and, in particular, the 
destruction of tropical forests (Rogner et al., 2007, IPCC, 2007b). And reducing land-
use change and forest degradation has been shown as a theoretically cost-effective 
way of slowing carbon emissions compared to other mitigation strategies such as 
curbing emissions from power stations.
Decisions taken at the recent Conferences of the Parties to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change suggest that payments for reduced emissions from 
deforestation and degradation (REDD) in developing countries may become part 
of the post-2012 international climate change response regime. Consequently, the 
governments of many industrialised countries are announcing significant new funds 
to explore the means to tackle climate change in this way (see Bond et al., 2009).
 
In essence, REDD payments will be global-level payments for ecosystem services. 
These payments are likely to take place at two levels: at the international to national 
level, between the international financing institutions (compliance market, voluntary 
market, and overseas development aid) and national level organisations; and at 
the national to sub-national level, between national institutions and sub-national 
levels such as land users, communities, and local governments (Angelsen and 
Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008). With this likelihood, further exploration of payments for 
watershed services in conjunction with REDD payments will be important since such 
‘bundled’ payments for ecosystem services hold considerable promise.
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Much like PWS, payments for REDD 
are conceptually simple, but there 
are multiple hurdles between 
conceptual appeal and effective 
implementation (see Angelsen and 
Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008). Key 
lessons here from the action-learning 
sites and international review 
are in the realm of governance. 
In particular, the application of 
contingency is likely to be highly 
contentious. Although the science 
underpinning REDD is better 
understood and less site-specific, massive challenges such as monitoring, reporting, 
and verifying emission reductions – especially at large scales – remain unresolved. 
The emergence of climate change as the predominant global conservation and 
development issue, and the spotlight on deforestation and degradation, present 
both opportunities and threats that cannot be ignored. Correctly and sensitively 
implemented, payments for REDD can represent a long-term stream of finance 
to address human development and ecosystem issues in developing countries 
that vastly exceeds any previous financial transfers made through development 
assistance channels (Eliasch, 2008). However, in many parts of the world that 
will become more arid and climate-stressed, REDD and related interventions will 
need to recognise, and be assessed for, their implications for all other ecosystem 
services, particularly water. The overt focus on carbon sequestration and the 
mitigation of climate change could easily lead to interventions and policies that 
ignore the multiple services and complexity of ecosystems and landscapes. Getting 
REDD wrong could be bad news for conservation and livelihoods; getting it right 
could greatly brighten the prospects for fair deals for watershed services.
Local experience with watersheds may tell us much 
about how we can respond to climate change
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Appendix 2: Action-learning site profiles
Bolivia: Los Negros
Biophysical description
Catchment name Rio Los Negros
Area 250 km2
Administration Santa Cruz department
Upstream (sellers) profile
Land owners and managers Communities of Santa Rosa, Palmasola and Sivingal
Land-use systems Forestry; agriculture; settlement
Land-use issue Conversion of cloud forest to settlement and agriculture
Livelihoods Small-scale agro-pastoral production systems
Downstream (buyers) profile
Water uses Domestic; agriculture
Water users Residents of Los Negros; farmers in Los Negros Valley
Abstraction Water for domestic use abstracted from river
Water for irrigation abstracted above town and diverted into 
eight canals
Payments for watershed services (PWS)
Core problem Changing land use reducing water quantity for horticultural 
producers
Further competition between urban domestic users and irrigators
Water service Water quantity
PWS mechanism Payments in-kind to farmers in catchment
Year one – beehives (one per 10 ha of forest conserved per year)
Year two – barbed wire
– in return for maintaining forest cover
Sellers of service In 2006: 34 landowners
Actual/potential buyers Commercial horticultural producers in Los Negros town
Direct impact Effectively, US$3/ha/year
Indirect benefits Improved trust between upstream and downstream communities
Higher levels of farmer confidence
Status of PWS mechanism Ongoing
Reference Asquith, N. and M. Vargas (2007) Fair Deals for Watershed 
Services in Bolivia, Natural Resources Issues No. 7. IIED, London.
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India: Bhoj Wetlands
Biophysical description
Catchment name Kolans River and the Bhoj Wetlands
Area 361 km2
Administration Madhya Pradesh state
Upstream (sellers) profile
Land owners and managers Privately owned farms and residences
Limited common land
Government-managed forest areas
Land-use systems Agriculture 76%  Urban 4% 
Plantations 6%  Wastelands 7%
Forest <1%  Water bodies 7%
Land-use issue Runoff from chemical fertiliser and pesticide use in agriculture in 
the rural catchment of the Bhoj Wetlands reaches the lake. This 
leads to eutrophication and reduced drinking water quality
Erosion contributes to sedimentation of the lake, reducing future 
storage capacity
Livelihoods Based around cultivation and livestock production. Locally, labour 
for agriculture important
Casual and regular labour in the city of Bhopal
Downstream (buyers) profile
Water uses Domestic 
Light and heavy industry 
Recreational use of the lakes
Water users Residents 
Light industry Heavy industry or bulk buyers
Distribution Abstraction and distribution by Bhopal Municipal Corporation
Payments for watershed services (PWS)
Core problem High levels of agro-chemicals in Bhoj Wetlands and lake
Water service Water quality
PWS mechanism Proposed: transition to wetland-friendly/organic farming 
practices through the use of compost and bio-pesticides
Sellers of service Not relevant
Actual/potential buyers Bhopal Municipal Corporation, corporate bodies, public
Direct impact Not relevant
Indirect benefits Not relevant
Status of PWS mechanism No mechanism implemented
Reference Agarwal, C., S. Tiwari, M. Borgoyary, A. Acharya and E. Morrison 
(2007) Fair Deals for Watershed Services in India, Natural 
Resources Issues No. 10. IIED, London.
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India: Bhodi-Suan
Biophysical description
Catchment name The Suan Khad in the Bhodi-Suan catchment
Area 7 km2
Administration Himachal Pradesh state
Upstream (sellers) profile
Land owners and managers Privately-owned farms with some common grazing land. Small 
area of government managed forest land
Land-use systems Cultivated 32%
Private haylands 25%
Grazing lands 27%
Forest 8%
River 5%
Wasteland 3%
Land-use issue Cultivation and over-grazing leading to erosion. Upper village 
suffers from wildfires
Livelihoods Small-scale agro-pastoral systems
Downstream (buyers) profile
Water uses Domestic; irrigation
Water users Households; farmers
Distribution Water is abstracted directly from the Suan Khad
Payments for watershed services (PWS)
Core problem Soil erosion and siltation of proposed dam and low dry season 
flows
Water service Water quality and quantity
PWS mechanism Proposed: inter-village agreement to close grazing areas in 
upstream Bhodi village to reduce erosion and siltation problems 
in downstream Suan village
Sellers of service Not relevant
Actual/potential buyers Residents of downstream village
Direct impact Not relevant
Indirect benefits Not relevant
Status of PWS mechanism Not implemented
Other Main reason for no PWS being developed was the divergent 
views on the hydrology
Reference Agarwal, C., S. Tiwari, M. Borgoyary, A. Acharya and E. Morrison 
(2007) Fair Deals for Watershed Services in India, Natural 
Resources Issues No. 10. IIED, London.
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India: Kuhan
Biophysical description
Catchment name Oach nala, also known as the Gulana khad
Area 4-5 km2
Administration Himachal Pradesh state
Upstream (sellers) profile
Land owners and managers Privately-owned farms with some common grazing land. Small 
area of government managed forest land
Land-use systems Cultivated 32%
Private haylands 12%
Forest 39%
River 6%
Wasteland 11%
Land-use issue Cultivation and over-grazing leading to erosion causing siltation 
of the downstream dam
Livelihoods Small-scale agro-pastoral systems
Downstream (buyers) profile
Water uses Domestic; irrigation
Water users Households; farmers
Distribution Water is abstracted directly from the small dam on the Oach nala
Payments for watershed services (PWS)
Core problem Cultivation and over-grazing leads to erosion causing siltation of 
the downstream dam
Water service Water quality and quantity
PWS mechanism Intra-village agreement to close off upstream grazing area for 
period of 8 years in exchange for saplings, grass and labour from 
downstream village
Sellers of service 21 upstream families
Actual/potential buyers Residents of downstream village
Direct impact Saplings when mature (in 20 years); increased grass harvest but 
loss of grazing
Indirect benefits Increased inter-village cooperation
Status of PWS mechanism Ongoing
Other Other soil and water conservation measures planned such as 
check dams on stream and bamboo barricades
Reference Agarwal, C., S. Tiwari, M. Borgoyary, A. Acharya and E. Morrison 
(2007) Fair Deals for Watershed Services in India, Natural 
Resources Issues No. 10. IIED, London.
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Indonesia: Brantas
Biophysical description
Catchment name Brantas River
Area 12,000 km2
Administration East Java province, Java
Upstream (sellers) profile
Land owners and 
managers
The upstream areas have been settled by communities. The 
government controls the upland forest areas
Land-use systems Rice fields 27%  Gardens 4% 
Dryland cultivation 23%  Forest 27% 
Settlement 20%  Others 1-2%
Land-use issue Increasing rate of conversion of forest land to agriculture and 
settlement. This is estimated to cause about 16% of the total silt 
load. The balance of the silt load is due volcanic eruptions and 
landslides
Livelihoods Small-scale agro-pastoral systems with an estimated annual 
household income of US$240. Significant proportion of the population 
is landless
Downstream (buyers) profile
Water uses Agricultural; domestic; industrial; hydro-electric power
Water users Estimated 387,000 ha of irrigation
Freshwater fishery on Brantas Dam
Households in Surabaya, Sidoarjo and Malang by Perusahaan Daerah 
Air Minum (PDAM – District Domestic Water Company)
Heavy and light industry (food, pharmaceuticals, chemical, etc.)
10 hydro-electric power stations on Brantas River
Distribution Urban water supply abstracted by PDAM at multiple points along river
Payments for watershed services (PWS)
Core problem Deforestation causing erosion and siltation of Brantas River
Water service Water quality
PWS mechanism PJT1 are paying US$5,800 over a three year period for replanting 
trees on 40 ha of critical land in two village as well as construction of 
terracing
Sellers of service 170 members of farmers’ group
Actual/potential buyers PJT1: government river basin authority
Direct impact Marginal increase to household income
Indirect benefits 60% of revenue invested in business ventures to diversity livelihoods
Status of PWS mechanism Ongoing
Other YPP, a locally based NGO facilitated the arrangement and also makes 
the payment to the farmers groups
Reference Munawir and S. Vermeulen (2007) Fair Deals for Watershed Services 
in Indonesia, Natural Resources Issues No. 9. IIED, London.
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Indonesia: Cidanau
Biophysical description
Catchment name Cidanau River
Area 226 km2
Administration Banten province, Java Island
Upstream (sellers) profile
Land owners and 
managers
Community
Government 
Perhutani (State Company)
Land-use systems Small-scale agro-pastoralism and forestry
Land-use issue Erosion causing high silt and inorganic chemical loads. Turbidity of 
water in Brantas River has increased 14 fold between 1999 and 2005
Livelihoods Small scale agro-pastoral systems with an estimated annual income 
of US$320. Significant proportion of the population is landless
Downstream (buyers) profile
Water uses Domestic; agricultural; industrial
Water users Households (est. 30 million m3/annum)
Irrigation (est. 0.2 million m3/annum)
Heavy and light industry (est. 35 million m3/annum)
Distribution Urban user in Cilagong by PDAM
Industrial via canal managed by KTI
Payments for watershed services (PWS)
Core problem High silt and inorganic chemical loads plus increasing nutrient levels 
are blocking abstraction and distribution infrastructure. Increasing 
demand for water by KTI and other industries
Water service Water quality
PWS mechanism Replanting 50 ha of critical land with trees. Each farmers group 
receives about US$80 for every 500 trees planted. Total value of 
agreement is about US$32,500 over five year years
Sellers of service 72 farmers
Actual/potential buyers KTI: government owned industrial conglomerate
Direct impact 95% revenue to meet seedling and planting costs. Direct impact low 
but in the context of falling household income. The net benefit of 
the replanting is estimated to be: US$ 85/ha
Indirect benefits 5% revenue invested in business ventures to diversity livelihoods. 
Improved negotiating position with government departments
Status of PWS mechanism Ongoing
Other PWS mechanism brokered by Cidanau Catchment Communication 
Forum (FKDC)
Reference Munawir and S. Vermeulen (2007) Fair Deals for Watershed Services 
in Indonesia, Natural Resources Issues No. 9. IIED, London.
Natural Resource Issues No. 13108
Jamaica: Buff Bay/Pencar
Biophysical description
Catchment name Buff Bay sub-catchment: Buff Bay River and White River
Pencar sub-catchment: Pencar River and Dry River
Area 202 km2
Administration Portland and Saint Mary’s parishes
Upstream (sellers) profile
Upstream (sellers) profile
Land owners and 
managers
75% of the catchment is privately owned of which 80% is in small 
plots <2 ha
Land-use systems Forest cover 67%
Fields – food crops 16%
Fields – pasture 6%
Coffee plantation 3%
Banana plantation 3%
Buildings/ infrastructure3% 
Other 2%
Changes in land use Estimated loss of 7% of forest between 1991 and 1999 (9 years)
Livelihoods Upper catchment coffee is the dominant crop.
Lower catchment banana production is the dominant crop
Downstream (buyers) profile
Water uses Domestic supply; agriculture
Water users Households in Annotto Bay and Buy Bay settlements
Distribution
Payments for watershed services (PWS)
Core problem Potential contamination due to pesticides, fertilisers and sewage. 
Some river bank erosion and sedimentation
Water service Water quality
PWS mechanism To be determined
Sellers of service Not relevant
Actual/potential buyers (Potential) water consumers in coastal areas
Direct impact Not relevant
Indirect benefits Not relevant
Status of PWS mechanism No mechanism developed
Reference McIntosh, S. and N. Leotaud (2007) Fair Deals for Watershed Services 
in the Caribbean, Natural Resources Issues No. 8. IIED, London.
Pantin, D. and V. Reid (2005), Economic Valuation Study: Action 
learning project on incentives for the Buff Bay/Pencar watershed. 
Caribbean Natural Resources Institute, Laventville and IIED, London.
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St Lucia: Talvan
Biophysical description
Catchment name Talvan sub-catchment in the Marquis catchment
Area 3.2 km2
Upstream (sellers) profile
Land owners and 
managers
95% of the catchment in private ownership, mostly in small parcels 
of less than 1.5 ha
Land-use systems Primary forest 3%
Mixed farming 31%
Intensive hillside farming 31%
Mixed agro-forestry 10%
Horticulture <1%
Settlement 9%
Abandoned cultivation 20%
Changes in land use Increasing urbanisation and settlement of catchment
Livelihoods Primarily an agricultural community with some wage employment
Downstream (buyers) profile
Water uses Domestic (urban)
Domestic (rural)
Water users Talvan watershed supplies 50% of potable water for Castries.
Distribution By the Water and Sewerage Company (WASCO).
Rural poor abstract directly from the river
Payments for watershed services (PWS)
Core problem Poor water quality due to high levels of leached nitrates, pesticide, 
faecal coliform and grey water discharge
Water service Water quality
PWS mechanism To be determined
Sellers of service Not relevant
Actual/potential buyers Potential: water and sewerage company and consumers
Direct impact Not relevant
Indirect benefits Not relevant
Status of PWS mechanism No PWS mechanism developed
Reference McIntosh, S. and N. Leotaud (2007) Fair Deals for Watershed Services 
in the Caribbean, Natural Resources Issues No. 8. IIED, London.
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South Africa: Sabie-Sand
Biophysical description
Catchment name Sabie-Sand River catchment
Area 7,631 km2
Administration Mpumalanga Province
Upstream (sellers) profile
Land owners and 
managers
Commercial forestry; commercial farming
Land-use systems Irrigated agriculture 2%
Forestry (plantation and indigenous) 12%
Rural settlements 4%
Wildlife 82%
Changes in land use Plantation forestry using alien species decreasing dry season stream 
flows
Livelihoods Around 66% of the catchment population live in communal lands 
and rely on subsistence agriculture and natural resource harvesting, 
remittances and state support. The rest are either urban residents, 
private land farmers or resident on mines
Downstream (buyers) profile
Water uses Domestic; farming; wildlife
Water users Households in Bushbuck Ridge settlement
Commercial wildlife producers
Kruger National Park
Distribution Water, particularly on wildlife ranches and Kruger National Park, 
abstracted directly from the river
Payments for watershed services (PWS)
Core problem Forestry plantations using alien species are decreasing dry season 
flows especially in the middle and lower catchment
Water service Water quantity
PWS mechanism No mechanism was proposed
Reference King, N., R. Wise and I. Bond (2008) Fair Deals for Watershed 
Services in South Africa. Natural Resources Issues No. 12. IIED, 
London.
Chapman, A. (2006) Hydrology and Land Use in the Sand River 
Catchment. Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Pretoria 
and IIED, London.
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South Africa: Ga-Selati 
Biophysical description
Catchment name Ga-Selati River
Area Total catchment 2,338 km2
Sub-catchment
Administration Limpopo Province
Upstream (sellers) profile
Land owners and 
managers
Limpopo Provincial Nature Authority
Commercial farmers (horticulture, livestock and wildlife)
Communal land farmers
Land-use systems Indigenous forest 2% 
Savanna 75%
Degraded 12%
Irrigated 3%
Dryland 1%
Other 7%
Land-use issue Reduced streamflow caused by invasive alien species in montane 
grasslands
Livelihoods Pervasive poverty in the peri-urban settlements of Balloon and 
Calais typical of former homelands created by apartheid
Downstream (buyers) profile
Water uses Irrigation
Water users Commercial producers of horticulture
Distribution Diverted into canal by simple weir
Payments for watershed services (PWS)
Core problem Decreasing streamflow in upper Ga-Selati River due to alien invasive 
species and inefficient irrigation methods. Total potential saving 
by controlling alien species estimated to be 3.6 million m3 over 10 
years
Water service Water quantity
PWS mechanism Potential payments from commercial farmers in lower section of 
upper catchment to clear alien invasive species from Legalametse 
Nature Reserve
Status of PWS mechanism No mechanism implemented
Reference King, N., R. Wise and I. Bond (2008) Fair Deals for Watershed 
Services in South Africa. Natural Resources Issues No. 12. IIED, 
London.
Chapman, A. (2005) Hydrology and Land Use in the Ga-Selati 
Catchment. Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Pretoria 
and IIED, London.
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Good clean water where we need it, when we need it – this is taken for granted by some, 
and is still only a dream for many others. Part of the challenge in meeting our water needs 
lies in getting to grips with what people are doing ‘up in the hills’. Land in the upper 
catchments may be used in ways that greatly affect the quantity and quality of water we 
get downstream. To get the water we want we have traditionally relied on regulation, 
exhortation, cooperation or just keeping our fingers crossed. What about some cold hard 
cash? What if downstream beneficiaries paid for agreed upstream land uses? This is the idea 
behind payments for watershed services. 
But who will sell, who will buy, and under what conditions? Can this be good for 
ecosystems and good for reducing poverty too? There is lots of theory about this.  
This report explores the evidence. It describes what the facilitators in a range of  
watershed sites around the world have learned in their efforts to establish such  
payment schemes. It concludes that these payments schemes are difficult to set up  
– but where they have been set up, they are generally beginning to do some good  
(there is not much evidence that they do any harm). More significantly, payments  
schemes – or efforts to set them up – have brought the current winners and losers  
into the open, and kicked off debate on what can be done. What is now needed  
is for more ‘buyers’ to step forward, and for the facilitators of payments for  
watershed services schemes to put hard-learned lessons from experience into  
practice at larger scales – ensuring buyers get what they pay for, sellers get  
a decent price, and watersheds get a fair deal. 
Fair deals for 
watershed services
Ivan Bond
James Mayers
Fair deals for w
atershed services 
 
 
 
B
ond and M
ayers
Developing markets 
for watershed  
services and  
improved livelihoods
